


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 Contents

Abstract

“Dead money” refers to family firm assets during intergenerational transfers and the potential for wealth loss in SAR, and the United States.


generate distinct patterns of transformation and continuity in family firms. The contribution of the paper is to identify external institutional factors that determine the central tendencies on family firm longevity in a literature that has hitherto focused on internal factors such as the efficacy of adopting professional management and succession planning.

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