
Comparative Political Studies



Abstract

studies indicate that disinflations. This ca author develops and By clicking "Accept Non-Essential Cookies", you agree to the storing of cookies on your device to enhance site navigation, analyze site usage, and assist in our marketing efforts. Privacy Policy Cookie Policy

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a few recent ut costs during utonomy. The pat central bank

independence (CBI) affects both the output and the unemployment costs of disinflation. Because central banks control only monetary policy, they should not exert a differential effect on the two ratios, and there should be a positive relationship between independence and both the unemployment and the output costs of disinflations. Second, by including a range of potentially significant political and institutional controls, the author demonstrates both the importance of political and institutional determinants of the costs of disinflation and that CBI is a robust predictor of those costs.



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