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Abstract

Organized crime research remains dominated by single-country analysis of perceptual data. This article presents a comparative analysis of predatory organized crime across three states to deliver key political goods such as security, justice, and stability encourages criminal groups to perform state functions. The economic failure hypothesis holds that poor economic outcomes such as high unemployment, low standards of living, and a reliance on an underground economy stimulates the growth of criminal syndicates as suppliers of demanded goods, services, and jobs. Analytical results provided general support to both hypotheses. Judicial independence and black market activities were the strongest political and economic correlates of predatory organized crime. Policy implications for organized crime control in developing countries are discussed.



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