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Amanda M. Girth is an associate professor at the John Glenn College of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University. Her research on the intersection of the public and private sectors focusses on implementation issues and accountability challenges in third-party governance.

Lauren E. Lopez coauthored this article while completing graduate work at The Ohio State University. She graduated in 2016 with a Master of Public Administration degree and a Master of Science degree in Economics. She is currently a lead finance analyst at the Colorado Department of Higher Education.

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