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Abstract

Almost all appointments involve the involvement of a head-hunter. Final selection is often made by the board chooses between candidates. The head-hunter. The existing literature on appointments. The way that search firms select who to put forward for consideration has not been investigated. In this paper the authors describe the working methods used by ten major London-based national and international executive search firms in identifying suitable candidates for CEO posts. Their findings are based on extensive interviews. The primary finding is that performance of candidates in various posts prior to being put forward for consideration plays a minor role in CEO selection compared to other considerations. Other findings have to do with CEO remuneration and on-going relations between head-hunters and successful candidates.



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