
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1.

1. Minor changes from the original have been made to correct various citation and, alas, stylistic and grammatical solecisms.

2.

2. Selection of "Key Works" was based entirely on my judgment.

3.

3. Buchanan explores the concept of *methodological individualism*, first coined by Karl Popper, in depth in articles collected in his *Fiscal Theory and Political Economy* (see C1, C2, C3, and others reprinted in that volume).

4.

4. In his undergraduate public economics textbook (B10), which I read as a college senior in 1961, Buchanan clearly expresses his doubts that government transfer payments were truly costless transfers as Pigou (1947) suggested. Unfortunately, he did not flesh out this enough for me to understand at that time the rent-seeking implications. I suspect he did not fully comprehend the enormity of his speculation at the time either.

5.

5. My impression of Chicago analysis of that era was that, except for Stigler, it explained costly social policy more by ignorance and misunderstanding than by interest group politics. 6.

6. One prominent public choice economist whose views definitely changed because of Buchanan and his Virginia School colleagues is Mancur Olson. One need only compare his 1965 and 1983 treatises to see this attitudinal shift.

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