

Land Economics

Decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from Hydropower Project Relicensing Michael R. Moore, Elizabeth B. Maclin and David W. Kershner Land Economics, August 2001, 77 (3) 423-442; DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3147134 PDF Info & Metrics References Abstract Theories of agency behavior are examined via an application to hydropower project relicensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In the relicensing of each project, fish and wildlife agencies submit recommendations to FERC. FERC then enters a two stage deliberation process for each recommendation. Econometric analysis of these decisions covers 933 recommendations made for 72 projects relicensed during 1980–96. A new law (the Electric Consumers Protection Act) substantially altered FERC's decisions, while a new administration (the Clinton administration) exerted a mixed effect. Both events influenced the number of recommendations per project made by the fish and wildlife agencies. (JEL K23, Q48) This article requires a subscription to view the full text. If you have a subscription you may use the login form below to view the article. Access to this article can also be purchased. Log in using your username and password Username Log in Forgot your user name or password? Purchase access You may purchase access to this article. This will require you to create an account if you don't already have one. Previous Next 🔁 ▲ Back to top In this issue Land Economics Vol. 77, Issue 3 1 Aug 2001 Table of Contents Table of Contents (PDF) Index by author Download PDF Share Article Alerts Email Article Citation Tools □ Bookmark this article ▼ Related Articles No related articles found.

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