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Anatomy of a financial crisis

| Published: June 1992

| Volume 2, pages 115–130, (1992) [Cite this article](#)[Save article](#) [View saved research](#) >


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Abstract

This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for understanding the nature of financial crises. It provides the following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform well to one in which output declines sharply. The asymmetric information framework explains the patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain. It indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank in which

the central bank uses the discount window to provide liquidity to sectors outside of the banking system.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 10027, New York, New York, USA

Frederic S. Mishkin

National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., USA

Frederic S. Mishkin

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About this article

Cite this article

Mishkin, F.S. Anatomy of a financial crisis. *J Evol Econ* 2, 115–130 (1992).

<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01193536>

Issue date

June 1992

DOI

<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01193536>

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[Asymmetric information](#)

[Lender-of-last-resort](#)

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