

Search



Home > The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice > Article

Government Intervention through an Implicit Federal Backstop: Is There a Link to Market Power?

Original Article | Published: 15 April 2015

Volume 40, pages 538–555, (2015) Cite this article



The Geneva Papers on Risk and

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

- > Store and/or access information on a device
- Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies



Access this article

<u>Log in via an institution</u> →

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic

€32.70 /Month

- Get 10 units per month
- Download Article/Chapter or eBook
- 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
- Cancel anytime

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles and news from researchers in related subjects, suggested using machine learning.

<u>Capital Markets</u> <u>Economic Policy</u> <u>Fiscal Policy</u> <u>Fiscal Law</u> <u>Insurance</u>

Public Finance

Notes

1. Merton (1977).

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

competitors". The GAO report did not indicate whether AIG's business losses were mitigated by pricing strategies.

- 7. Even though AIG's difficulties stemmed from operations in the AIG Financial Products division, the apparent perception by some competitors was that the bailout would provide capital relief company-wide, as noted by Mr. Kelly.
- 8. <u>Keeley (1990)</u>.
- 9. Much of the money AIG received was used to offset losses from their Financial Products division. However, the moral hazard problem created by the TARP funds is independent of funds deployment. That is, it is the existence of the potential capital infusion that creates the moral hazard problem for insurers,

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

- 17. Cummins and Sommer (1996).
- 18. Baranoff and Sager (2002).
- 19. Lin et al. (2014).
- 20. Cheng and Weiss (2013).
- 21. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).

77 B 114 (2000)

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

- 29. <u>Cummins (2002)</u>.
- 30. <u>Cummins and Weiss (1991)</u>.
- 31. These data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Database housed at the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
- 32. <u>Cotterill (1986)</u>.
- 33. The inverse HHI does not give the exact number of firms in the market, but rather is the number of firms that would be in the market if each firm had the same market share.

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

behaviour related to market concentration during the bailout period, but we also found significant differences between models between the two subsamples for most of the business lines. The differences between models suggest that AIG's pricing behaviour differs from that of other carriers over time, but there is no systematic evidence that AIG took advantage of its bailout funding to increase its market share in competitive markets. Results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.

References

Bain, J.S. (1951) 'Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing, 1936–1940' The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65 (3): 293–324.

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Vermont', The Review of Economics and Statistics 68 (3): 379-386.

Article Google Scholar

Cummins, J.D. (ed.) (2002) Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance: Restoring Competition and Increasing Market Efficiency, Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.

Google Scholar

Cummins, J.D. and Danzon, P.M. (1997) 'Price, financial quality, and capital flows in insurance markets', Journal of Financial Intermediation 6 (1): 3–38.

Article Google Scholar

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Keeley, M.C. (1990) 'Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking', The American Economic Review 80 (5): 1183–1200.

Google Scholar

Lin, W.-C., Lai, Y.-H. and Powers, M.R. (2014) 'The relationship between regulatory pressure and insurer risk taking', The Journal of Risk and Insurance 81 (2): 271–301.

Article Google Scholar

Merton, R.C. (1977) 'An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory', Journal of Banking & Finance 1 (1): 3–11.

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Shrieves, R.E. and Dahl, D. (1992) 'The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks', Journal of Banking & Finance 16 (2): 439-457.

Article Google Scholar

Stigler, G.J. (1964) 'A theory of oligopoly', The Journal of Political Economy 72 (1): 44–61.

Article Google Scholar

Weiss, M.A. and Choi, B.P. (2008) 'State regulation and the structure, conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers', Journal of Banking & Finance 32

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Eckles, D., Hilliard, J. Government Intervention through an Implicit Federal Backstop: Is There a Link to Market Power?. *Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract* **40**, 538–555 (2015).

https://doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2015.5

Received Accepted Published

Your privacy, your choice

We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 **partners**, also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.

By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our **privacy policy** for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.

You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.

We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:

Store and/or access information on a device

Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development

Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies

Find a journal
Publish with us
Track your research
Your privacy, your choice
We use essential cookies to make sure the site can function. We, and our 95 partners , also use optional cookies and similar technologies for advertising, personalisation of content, usage analysis, and social media.
By accepting optional cookies, you consent to allowing us and our partners to store and access personal data on your device, such as browsing behaviour and unique identifiers. Some third parties are outside of the European Economic Area, with varying standards of data protection. See our privacy policy for more information on the use of your personal data. Your consent choices apply to springer.com and applicable subdomains.
You can find further information, and change your preferences via 'Manage preferences'. You can also change your preferences or withdraw consent at any time via 'Your privacy choices', found in the footer of every page.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Store and/or access information on a device
Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development
A A - III III III
Accept all cookies

Reject optional cookies