


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Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations

An Evaluation

| Chapter

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[The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise](#)

Enterprise

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governmental policy towards the sector; and (c) managing nonprofit organizations. More specifically, I discuss theories' ability to enlighten our understanding of the scope of inquiry, the determinants of the size and scope of the nonprofit sector, and the behavioral responses of donors, volunteers, paid staff, and nonprofit organizations to changes in their external environment. I then turn, more briefly and selectively, to theories' ability to inform tax policy towards donations, taxation of nonprofit entities, competition among and between organizations in the various sectors, and fundraising regulation. Finally, I briefly discuss theories' ability to improve the pricing, fundraising, and evaluation functions of nonprofit management.

Note: A shorter version of this chapter has been published as "Overall Analysis of Economic Theories" in *Voluntas*, 8, 179-204. The sections on governmental policy

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
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