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Equality, responsibility, and justice as seen from a utilitarian perspective

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In my view, some of Rawls's arguments are based on misconceptions about the nature of free will and of moral responsibility. To clarify these issues, I am proposing a new conception of free will and of moral responsibility, which I call *the bearer's responsibility* view.

Finally, I argue against the high priority that Rawls assigns to justice (or to fairness) over other social values, and against the even higher priority that Kant assigns to morality over other values of human life.

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
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
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