

[Home](#) > [International Journal of Game Theory](#) > [Article](#)

[Published: March 1995](#)

On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten

[Eric van Damme](#)

International Journal of Game Theory **24**, 3–11 (1995)

239 Accesses | **13** Citations | [Metrics](#)

This is a preview of subscription content, [access via your institution](#).

Access options

Buy article PDF

39,95 €

Price includes VAT (Poland)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy policy](#).

[Accept all cookies](#)

[Manage preferences](#)

in randomized strategies. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 1:67-96

Aumann RJ (1976) Agreeing to disagree. *The Annals of Statistics* 4:1236-1239

Aumann R, Brandenburger A (1991) Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Working paper 91-042. Harvard Business School

Binmore K, Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1992) Noncooperative models of Bargaining 7:179-225. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) *Handbook of Game Theory Vol 1*. North-Holland Amsterdam

Debreu G (1984) Economic theory in the mathematical mode. In: *Les Prix Nobel 1983*. Reprinted in *American Economic Review* 74:267-278

Güth W (1994) On the scientific work of John C Harsanyi, John F Nash, and Reinhard Selten. Discussion Paper 35, Humboldt-University of Berlin

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy_policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed strategy equilibrium points. *International Journal of Game Theory* 2:1-23

Harsanyi JC (1995) A new look at strategic rationality: At equilibrium selection, risk dominance and payoff dominance. *Games and Economic Behavior* 8:91-122

Harsanyi JC, Selten R (1988) A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press Cambridge MA

Kalisch GK, Milnor JW, Nash JF, Nering ED (1954) Some experimental n-person games. Chapter 21: 301-327 In: Thrall RM, Coombs CH, Davids RL (eds) *Decision Processes*. Wiley New York

Kohlberg E, Mertens J-F (1986) On the strategic stability of equilibria. *Econometrica* 54:1003-1037

Kreps D, Sobel J (1994) Signalling, chapter 25

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

Luce RD, Raiffa H (1957) Games and Decisions.
Wiley New York

Mertens J-F, Zamir S (1985) Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory 14:1-29

Maynard Smith J, Price G (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246:15-18

Myerson RB, Satterthwaite MA (1983) Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29:265-285

Nash JF (1950a) Equilibrium points in n -person games. Proceedings from the National Academy of Sciences, USA 36:48-49

Nash JF (1950b) Non-cooperative Games. PhD Dissertation Princeton University

Nash JF (1950c) The bargaining problem.

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

Neumann J von (1928) Zur Theory der Gesellschaftsspiele. *Mathematical Annals* 100:295-320

Neumann J von, Morgenstern O (1944) *Theory of games and economic behavior*. Princeton University Press Princeton NJ (Page numbers refer to the third edition from 1953)

Roth AE (1993) The early history of experimental economics. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 15:184-209

Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. *Econometrica* 50:97-109

Selten R (1965) Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswirtschaft* 12:301-324 und 667-689

Selten R (1975) Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. *International Journal of Game*

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

Selten R (1995) An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives. *Games and Economic Behavior* 8:213-263

Tirole J (1988) *The theory of industrial organization*. MIT Press Cambridge MA

Van Damme E (1994) *Strategic equilibrium*. Forthcoming in: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) *Handbook in Game Theory 3* (1995). North Holland Amsterdam

Van Damme E, Weibull J (1995) *Equilibrium in strategic interaction: The contributions of John C Harsanyi, John F Nash and Reinhard Selten*. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 97:15-40

Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. *Journal of Finance* 16:8-37

Weibull J (1994) *The "Mass-Action"*

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy_policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

**Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands**

Eric van Damme

Rights and permissions

[Reprints and Permissions](#)

About this article

Cite this article

van Damme, E. On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten. *Int J Game Theory* **24**, 3–11 (1995). <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258199>

Issue Date

March 1995

DOI

<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258199>

Keywords

Economic Theory

Game Theory

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy_policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)

Your Privacy

We use cookies to make sure that our website works properly, as well as some 'optional' cookies to personalise content and advertising, provide social media features and analyse how people use our site. By accepting some or all optional cookies you give consent to the processing of your personal data, including transfer to third parties, some in countries outside of the European Economic Area that do not offer the same data protection standards as the country where you live. You can decide which optional cookies to accept by clicking on 'Manage Settings', where you can also find more information about how your personal data is processed. Further information can be found in our [privacy_policy](#).

Accept all cookies

[Manage preferences](#)