

Budgetary Collective Action Problems: Convergence and Compliance under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union

James D. Savage

First published: 17 December 2002

<https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00004>



Abstract

Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in which the problem a hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all budgetary agreements and treaties.

Citing Literature



[Download PDF](#)

ABOUT WILEY ONLINE LIBRARY

This website utilizes technologies such as cookies to enable essential site functionality, as well as for analytics, personalization, and targeted advertising. You may change your settings at any time or accept the default settings. You may close this banner to continue with only essential cookies. [Privacy Policy](#)



Manage Preferences

Accept All

Reject Non-Essential

Contact Us
Training and Support
DMCA & Reporting Piracy
Sitemap

OPPORTUNITIES

Subscription Agents
Advertisers & Corporate Partners

CONNECT WITH WILEY

The Wiley Network
Wiley Press Room

Copyright © 1999-2026 John Wiley & Sons, Inc or related companies. All rights reserved, including rights for text and data mining and training of artificial intelligence technologies or similar technologies.

WILEY

This website utilizes technologies such as cookies to enable essential site functionality, as well as for analytics, personalization, and targeted advertising. You may change your settings at any time or accept the default settings. You may close this banner to continue with only essential cookies. [Privacy Policy](#)



Manage Preferences

Accept All

Reject Non-Essential