(https://www.ssrn.co	Product & ^{m/)} Services	Subscribe	Submit a paper	Browse	Rankings	Blog ⊅	Contact	었 ᆬ (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ShoppingCar
📆 Download Thi	s Paper (Deliv	ery.cfm/SSRN_I	D1986953_0	code596958.	pdf?abstractid=	-1784545&n	nirid=1)	
Open PDF in Brow	vser (Delivery.	cfm/SSRN_ID19	986953_code	2596958.pdf?	Pabstractid=178	4545&miric	l=1&type=2)	

Add Paper to My Library

Share: 🛉 🎔 🖾 🔗

Determinants and Implications of Fee Changes in the Hedge Fund Industry

44 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2011 Last revised: 11 Nov 2012

Vikas Agarwal (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=151145) Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business; University of Cologne - Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Sugata Ray (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=596958) University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Date Written: March 13, 2011

Abstract

Using a novel dataset that tracks daily changes in hedge fund fee structure, we examine the determinants and consequences of changes in the three components of the fee structure, namely the management fee, incentive fee, and the high-water mark provision. We find that funds respond symmetrically to past performance by increasing and decreasing their incentive fee following good and poor performance respectively. Further, funds increase their management fee after higher capital flows to mitigate decreasing returns to scale while larger funds decrease their management fee to pass on the economies of scale to the investors. Increase in the incentive fee is typically accompanied by addition of the high-water mark provision to mitigate the risk-taking behavior. Competitive forces in the hedge fund industry also drive the fee changes as funds which deviate from the average fees within their investment style tend to change their fees towards the average. Fee changes affect both future fund performance and investor flows. Future performance is worse subsequent to fee increases but there is no improvement in the future performance for fee decreases. Fund flows tend to be higher after fee decreases, a result driven by the management fee rather than the incentive fee. These findings indicate fees being determined by the bargaining between managers and investors while consequences of fee changes reflect the opportunistic behavior of managers in expropriating surplus from their investors.

Keywords: hedge fund fee changes

Suggested Citation >

Show Contact Information >

ሺ Download This Paper (Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1986953_code596958.pdf?abstractid=1784545&mirid=1)

Open PDF in Browser (Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1986953_code596958.pdf?abstractid=1784545&mirid=1&type=2)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Place Job Opening (https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/Announcements-Jobs/)

Paper statistics

DOWNLOADS	356
ABSTRACT VIEWS	2,878

RANWe use cookies that are necessary to make our site work. We may also use additional cookies, 20 ginalyze, improve, and personalize our content and your digital experience. For more information, see our <u>Cookie</u> <u>Policy (https://www.elsevier.com/legal/cookienotice)</u>

PlumX Metrics



(https://plu.mx/ssrn/a/? Related ejournals ssrn_id=1784945)	
American Finance Association Meetings (AFA) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalBrowse&journal_id=239868)	
Follow	
Feedback \wp	
Submit a Paper > (https://hq.ssrn.com/submission.cfm)	
SSRN Quick Links	\sim
SSRN Rankings	\checkmark

About SSRN

f (https://www.facebook.com/SSRNcommunity/)

in (https://www.linkedin.com/company/493409?

 $trk = tyah \& trk Info = clicked Vertical \% 3 A company \% 2 Centity Type \% 3 A entity History Name \% 2 C clicked Entity Id \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 2 C id x \% 3 A company _ 493409 \% 3 A comp$

(http://www.elsevier.com/)

Copyright (https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/dmca-notice-policy/) Terms and Conditions (https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/terms-of-use/) Privacy Policy (https://www.elsevier.com/legal/privacy-policy)

All content on this site: Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc., its licensors, and contributors. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies. For all open access content, the Creative Commons licensing terms apply.

We use cookies to help provide and enhance our service and tailor content.

To learn more, visit Cookie Settings.

(http://www.relx.com/)

(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/updateInformationLog.cfm?process=true)

We use cookies that are necessary to make our site work. We may also use additional cookies to analyze, improve, and personalize our content and your digital experience. For more information, see our <u>Cookie</u> <u>Policy (https://www.elsevier.com/legal/cookienotice)</u>