

5,845 49

Views

CrossRef citations to date

0

Altmetric

Original Articles

# Audit office size, audit quality and audit pricing: evidence from small- and medium-sized enterprises

Stefan Sundgren & Tobias Svanström

Pages 31-55 | Published online: 25 Jul 2012

Cite this article <https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2012.691710>

Sample our  
Economics, Finance,  
Business & Industry Journals  
>> [Sign in here](#) to start your access  
to the latest two volumes for 14 days

Full Article

Figures & data

References

Citations

Metrics

Reprints & Permissions

Read this article

## Abstract

Using Sw  
firm and  
against  
We find  
firms an  
We refer  
warn  
Sweden  
between  
associat  
indicate  
These re

with audit  
is issued  
audit quality.  
4 audit  
and BDO).  
ties of  
auditors in  
ociation  
ors. This  
attern and  
r expertise.  
ent market.

### We Care About Your Privacy

We and our 842 partners store and/or access information on a device, such as unique IDs in cookies to process personal data. You may accept or manage your choices by clicking below, including your right to object where legitimate interest is used, or at any time in the privacy policy page. These choices will be signaled to our partners and will not affect browsing data. [Privacy Policy](#)

We and our partners process data to provide:

Use precise geolocation data. Actively scan device characteristics for identification. Store and/or access information on a device. Personalised advertising and content, advertising and content measurement, audience research and services development.

List of Partners (vendors)

I Accept

Essential Only

Show Purpose



However, contrary to prior studies, our results suggest that the important dimensions are Top 6 versus non-Top 6 and the office size of non-Top 6 audit firms.

Keywords: audit fees audit offices audit quality private companies disciplinary sanctions Top 6 audit firms

## Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper benefited from comments made at the FIBE workshop held at the Norwegian School of Economics in January 2011, and the Sixth EarNet Symposium held at the Norwegian School of Economics in September 2011. We thank Sergey Hambardzumyan for research assistance. Stefan Sundgren gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Academy of Finland (grant 126630). We appreciate helpful comments from the anonymous reviewers.

## Notes

Disciplinary action may of course also be taken against auditors of publicly held companies. However, the vast majority of all disciplinary cases are related to audits of privately held companies.

The average number of audit assignments held by auditors-in-charge in Sweden was 123 in 2008.

Small firms (with fewer than 50 employees) are not allowed to be public limited companies unless their total assets exceed 4.4 million euro, and their revenue exceeds 7 million euro. The government directed the audit firms to be public limited companies by September 2008.

The government has set three size categories for audit firms: small (fewer than 3 million SEK (1 Euro = 10 SEK)), medium (3 million to 10 million SEK) and large (more than 10 million SEK) and

an average number of full-time employees of three. If auditing is no longer required, the general meeting should actively take a decision not to have an audit.

Auditing is also required in 21,200 trading partnerships, 15,000 foundations, 1530 foreign branches, 270 insurance companies, 75 banks, 70 economic associations, 15 non-profit organisations, 5 sole proprietorships and 4 European companies (SOU [2008:32](#), p. 124).

In 2006, the two institutes for public accountants in Sweden, Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer (FAR), and Svenska Revisorsamfundet (SRS), merged. From September 2006 until March 2010, they used the name FARSR. Since March 2010, this Institute has been called FAR.

In addition to these types of auditor, there are auditors who have gained approval without taking an examination. Such auditors are allowed to audit small firms over a transitional period.

Reported revenues in Sweden for Öhrlings PwC, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Deloitte were 10.383 billion SEK (1 EUR = 8.81 SEK, as of 21 February 2012).

Reported turnover for the largest 10 audit firms in 2009 (in Euros): (1) PricewaterhouseCoopers 471 million, (2) Ernst & Young 296 million, (3) KPMG 218 million, (4) Deloitte 148 million, (5) Grant Thornton 97 million, (6) BDO 60 million, (7) SET Revisionsbyrå 34 million, (8) Baker Tilly 18 million, (9) Nexia 6 million and (10) Rödl & Partners 6 million.

Among the largest audit firms in Sweden, Ernst & Young 6.3 billion SEK.

The quality of audits is regulated by the EU.

In the period 2007-2009, 7 (26.3%)

were the result of tips

from (6) based on

tips from

The SBPA 2009 (SBPA

Annual Report the cases led

to the imposition of sanctions.



From 2005 to 2009, the average number of approved and authorised auditors was 4083.

Note that Palmrose ([1988](#)) investigated litigation cases against auditors, not disciplinary sanctions.


During the 1970s and 1980s, there were eight big audit firm networks ('Big 8'). Two big mergers in 1989 reduced the group to 'Big 6'. This became 'Big 5' when Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse merged in 1998. Since the disappearance of Andersen in 2002, the current large audit firms have been referred to as 'Big 4'.

The following switches of employees were identified. One auditor who had worked for a Big 4 audit firm had switched to a small firm and one auditor who had worked for a small audit firm had switched to a Big 4 firm. Two auditors who had worked for Grant Thornton or BDO switched to small audit firms. Finally, there were a few switches between small audit firms. The few switches indicate that the data at the end of 2009 were also representative of the situation prior to 2009.

Exchange rate at 21 February 2012.

This is the age of the auditors without a sanction in 2007; the mean and the median year of the sanctions in the sample are 2007.

We also ran the regressions in [Table 4](#) separately for Big 4 auditors and for auditors employed by Grant Thornton and BDO. The office size measures were insignificant in all these regressions.

Indeed,  have more audit as... es. We received... 5 auditors in our sam... ation agency... ne age of the a... ore exposed to audit... dditional variable... are still significant... Also had positive... regressions in [Table 4](#) v... nts for auditors who had lost their certification was not available.

Tables with industry distribution for the audit fee sample, descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for included variables in the audit fee regression models is available upon request from the authors.

We also calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) in order to examine whether multicollinearity significantly influenced our empirical results. The highest VIFs in the regressions in [Table 6](#) were 5.28 and 6.69 in [Table 7](#), thus suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.

We ran the regressions separately on Big 4 audit firms and Grant Thornton or BDO. LNOFFICESIZE had a positive coefficient significant at the 0.10 level in the regression on the 97 observations audited by Grant Thornton or BDO and a positive but insignificant coefficient in the regression with Big 4 audited companies in the sample.

## Related research

People also read

Recommended articles

Cited by  
49



Information for

- Authors
- R&D professionals
- Editors
- Librarians
- Societies

Opportunities

- Reprints and e-prints
- Advertising solutions
- Accelerated publication
- Corporate access solutions

Open access

- Overview
- Open journals
- Open Select
- Dove Medical Press
- F1000Research

Help and information

- Help and contact
- Newsroom
- All journals
- Books

Keep up to date

Register to receive personalised research and resources by email

 Sign me up



✕