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Original Articles

Competition and efficiency in the Dutch life insurance industry

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should reveal where policy measures in order to promote competition might be appropriate.

[†]The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of CPB or DNB

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⁵A typical endowment insurance policy pays a given amount at a given date if a given person is still alive, or earlier when he or she passes away. Of course, there are many variants to these archetypes.

⁶The fiscal regime change might cause a structural break. However, re-estimation of our model for two sub-periods, before and after the change, did not give different results.

⁷For a fuller discussion we refer to CPB (2005). See also Kamerschen (2004).

⁸For a detailed analysis of the various effects we refer to CPB (<u>2003</u>).

 9 Concentration ratios are discussed in Bikker and Haaf (2002). where s_{i} represents the market share of firm i.

¹⁰In 1996, Japanese entrance increased sharply due to a structural change.

¹¹Acquisition costs are marketing costs and sales costs, which include commissions to insurance agents.

¹²Incidentally, a new Dutch Financial Services Act (Wet Financiële Dienstverlening) has come into force at the begin of 2006, pressing for more transparency in this market, which may also work to improve competition in this submarket.

¹³See Co ıide), Septeml ¹⁴This in hat further nange when consolid r growth new ent path. uation 3, see, for ¹⁶The fir posed by Aigner e Lovell (1979) p ¹⁷This ex which can

be calculated from expectations of u_{it} , conditional upon the observed values of v_{it} and

u_{it} , (Battese and Coelli, <u>1992</u>, 1993, 1995). $^{18}\text{Note that the E}(c_{it}\mid u_{it}$, X) differs from actual costs, c_{it} , due to v_{it} . ¹⁹An alternative definition would be the inverse of EFF it, INEFF it = exp(u_{it}), which is bounded between 1 and ∞ . ²⁰See Boone and Weigand in CPB (2000) and Boone (2001, 2004). ²¹More competition can force firms to consolidate (see our scale economies discussion). Claessens and Laeven (2004) found in a world wide study on banking that concentration was positively instead of negatively related to competition. ²²Suppose that the negative profit firms are price fighters. In a well-functioning market the price fighters will-influence profitability of the other firms. ²³Some insurance firms can approximate their value added by comparing their embedded value over time. These data are not publicly available. ²⁴The definition of production of life insurance firms is discussed further in subsection 'cost X-inefficiency'. ²⁵The price of management, or wages, has been excluded by applying the two standard properties of cost functions, namely linear homogeneity in the input prices and cost exhausti X ²⁶Of cou ation lies far out of ou ²⁷This fig ues of the numeric naximizes the deg utput price and mci ²⁹ISIS da res would be more ³⁰For ins than those in other

- ³¹A similar picture emerges from figures of CEDA (2004), p. 198.
- ³²This lagging adjustment of profitability does not disturb the international comparison, as this limitation holds also for the foreign data.
- ³³Note that the variable cost may change over the size classes due to scale efficiency (just as the marginal cost may do), so that the average variable cost may differ from the marginal cost. Apart from this theoretical dissimilarity, these variables are also measured differently in practice.

³⁴We have also estimated random effect models for profits (Table 8) and markets shares (Table 9). Their coefficients were quite similar to those of the fixed effect models, with even slightly higher values and higher levels of significance. This suggests that the estimates presented in Tables 8 and 9 are quite robust. We tested for random effect using the Hausman test, but this test appeared to be undefined, suffering from the 'small sample problem'. All models include year dummies, also not shown in the tables.

 35 The value of the Boone-indicator in these estimations is around -0.85. Results can be obtained from the authors.

³⁶The elasticity of this variable is the coefficient (0.45) times the average of the unit-



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
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