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Articles

The joint demand for health care, leisure, and commodities: Implications for health care finance and access in Vietnam

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ABSTRA

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Notes

1. For example, Gertler et al. (1987) find that although user fees generate substantial revenue in Peru, they are accompanied by large reductions in aggregate consumer welfare, with the poor shouldering most of this burden. Sahn et al. (2003) show that own-price health care elasticities in Tanzania are decreasing in income, suggesting higher fees create larger barriers to care for the poor. Analogously, Deininger and Mpuga (2005) find that the removal of user fees in Uganda led to improved access to care by the poor and a reduced probability of sickness.

2. This is consistent with the broader literature on the demand for health care services. One notable exception to the lack of research on alternatives to user fees is that on community financing of health care in Carrin (1992).

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6. Another practical reason for restricting the sample in this manner is that the VLSS only collects commune level health centre information in non-urban locations.

7. This is a reasonable assumption given that public clinics are located in each of the surveyed communes and are typically the least expensive treatment alternative. In cases where an individual visited both a pharmacy and non-clinic provider, we model the probability of the former, given the likelihood that the pharmacy visit is for an unrelated minor illness.

8. Private facilities consist mainly of private clinics, since the exclusion of urban households makes private hospital visits highly unlikely. House calls made by doctors/nurses in a private capacity are included in private facilities while those made in an official government capacity are included in public clinics. Pharmacy transactions also include drugs purchased from ‘medicine peddlers’. Although the VLSS collects information on traditional (eastern) medical practitioners, only 2.3 per cent of health care demanders used their services. Therefore, traditional practitioners are included in the no-care category.

9. Dow (1995) also demonstrates via a dynamic model of health inputs that estimates conditional on health status can only capture the short-run effects of policy reform while unconditional estimates yield long-run demand elasticities.

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Related Research Data

Are user fees regressive
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World Development Report 2002
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Does selection on health status matter?
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