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
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I trust you, I trust you not: a longitudinal study of control mechanisms in incentive contracts

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Abstract

The relationship between trust and control mechanisms in incentive contracts is explored, focusing on a longitudinal case study of a variety of control mechanisms. Empirical data were gathered from a variety of sources. Results indicate that the control mechanisms used in the study are not always effective. The study also shows that the control mechanisms used in the study are not always effective. The study also shows that the control mechanisms used in the study are not always effective.

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