



The International History Review >

Volume 32, 2010 - [Issue 2](#)

671	6	0
Views	CrossRef citations to date	Altmetric

Articles

# The GATT-EEC Collision: The Challenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950-67

Francine McKenzie

Pages 229-252 | Published online: 16 Jun 2010

Cite this article <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2010.489752>

Sample our  
Humanities  
Journals



>> [Sign in here](#) to start your access  
to the latest two volumes for 14 days

Full Article

Figures & data

Citations

Metrics

Reprints & Permissions

Read this article

Share

## **The GATT–EEC Collision: The Challenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950–67**

Francine McKenzie\*

### **Introduction**

Eric Wyndham White, the first Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1948–68), once likened his organization to Cinderella.<sup>1</sup> Although he did not draw out all the parallels, the comparison was apt. Like Cinderella, the GATT was engaged in backbreaking, unglamorous work: principally tariff negotiations. It was dressed in rags; it had a small staff, temporary offices until 1968, and an inadequate budget. It was overshadowed by stepsisters: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And it arrived late at the ball of post-war reconstruction. The GATT came into effect on 1 January 1948 as an interim measure and was supposed to be superseded by the International Trade Organization (ITO). For complicated reasons, the ITO never came into being, leaving the GATT to promote and manage global trade for the next fifty years.<sup>2</sup> Finally, like Cinderella, the GATT was transformed: it rose above its initial disadvantages to become a full-fledged member of the international community.<sup>3</sup>

The comparison with Cinderella is particularly apposite because of the many challenges that the GATT confronted. One of the earliest was the creation of a regional trade bloc, the European Economic Community (EEC). The General Agreement permitted the establishment of regional customs unions under Article XXIV. However, the terms of the Treaty of Rome (1957) amongst the six founding members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, usually referred to as the Six) fell short of those requirements. Indeed, several features of the Treaty of Rome contravened GATT norms and rules, including non-discrimination and the lowering of barriers to trade. Because the six EEC states were also members of the GATT (called contracting parties), the GATT had to respond. According to Wyndham White, a response was not only necessary but urgent because the EEC threatened the GATT's very survival.<sup>4</sup> In an effort that lasted almost twenty years, the GATT Secretariat, bolstered by many of its contracting parties, tried to hold the Six to GATT practices and obligations. But to the members of the EEC, GATT attempts to modify and control the form of integration threatened to sabotage their regional objectives. As Wyndham White

---

\*Email: fmckenzi@uwo.ca.

I am grateful to Tom Zeiler, Al Eckes, Kathy Rasmussen, Lucia Coppolaro, Thomas Gijswijt, Kim Nossal and Mike Szonyi for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 410-2007-2502.

<sup>1</sup> 'The Achievements of the GATT', an address by Eric Wyndham White at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, December 1956, Geneva. W[orld] T[rade] O[rganization archives] Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> For different explanations of the failure of the ITO compare T. W. Zeiler, *Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT* (Chapel Hill, 1999), chapter 9 and R. Toye, 'Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the Fight for the International Trade Organisation, 1947–1948', *The International History Review*, xxv, (June 2003), 282–305.

<sup>3</sup> Political scientists describe GATT as an international regime. Krasner has provided the classic definition of regimes: 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.' See 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', in S. D. Krasner (ed), *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London, 1983), 1. J. Finlayson and M. Zacher describe the GATT more specifically as a 'normative-institutional framework in which governments pursued multilateral trade regulation and discussed trade policy.' Because it did not cover all matters related to trade, they believe that the GATT was a subset of an international trade regime. Their article 'The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers: regime dynamics and functions' in *International Regimes*, (Krasner [ed], p. 274) examines the degree to which states adhered to the norms and rules laid out in the General Agreement. But I use the term organization rather than regime to describe the GATT. Most scholars acknowledge that the distinction between a regime and an organization is slight. My preference for organization does however point to a different emphasis: my work is empirically based with the goal of explaining the GATT in practice and as an international actor.

<sup>4</sup> Geneva to External, GATT – Attitude of the Executive Secretary (Wyndham White) Towards the Common Market, 13 May 1957, [Ottawa], L[ibrary and] A[rchives] C[anada], RG19 (Department of Finance): 4205/8714-24-9 pt. 1; G. Patterson also concluded that if the GATT had not bent, the EEC would have destroyed it: *Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues 1945–1965* (Princeton, 1966), 263; J. H. Jackson observed that the EEC brought about the collapse of the GATT's legal discipline, discussed in J. Bhagwati, P. Khrishna, and A. Panagariya (eds), *Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements* (Cambridge and London, 1999), 7–8.

<sup>5</sup> 'Europe in the GATT', address by Wyndham White, Europe House, London, May 1960, WTO.

<sup>6</sup> As Harry Hawkins had put it in 1944, 'Nations which are economic enemies are not likely to remain political friends for long.' Quoted in J.H. Jackson, *World Trade and The Law of GATT: a legal analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (Indianapolis, 1969), 38.

<sup>7</sup> F. McKenzie, 'GATT in the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947-1959', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, x (Summer 2008), 78-109.

<sup>8</sup> R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, 1990), 90; as I. M. Destler explained it, Washington 'desired to promote its values abroad, to create a secure international order, and to strengthen political ties with its allies.' See *American Trade Politics*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Washington, D.C., 2005), 7.

<sup>9</sup> G. R. Winham, *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation* (Princeton, 1986), 377.

<sup>10</sup> Several scholars have asserted that the GATT was primarily a technical agency in which skilled trade officials worked to develop and manage an international trade regime largely impervious to geopolitical pressures and considerations. R. Cooper, 'Trade policy is foreign policy', *Foreign Policy*, ix (1972/3), 19; K. Kock, *International Trade Policy and the GATT, 1947-1967* (Stockholm, 1969), 73; Zacher and Finlayson, 'The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers', 314.

<sup>11</sup> T. W. Zeiler's studies focus on the conflicting visions of the US and UK with respect to the post-war trade regime. He concludes that the form of the GATT was a triumph for US values and was instrumental in the country's geopolitical goals and national security. See *Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT* (Chapel Hill and London, 1999). In 'GATT Fifty years Ago: U.S. Trade Policy and Imperial Tariff Preferences', *Business and Economic History*, xxvi (1997), 709-17, he argues that there was a compromise between the US and UK over several key elements of the GATT. Susan Ariel Aaronson's work also focuses on the establishment of GATT and she examines the domestic political controversy that it, as well as the ITO, engendered. See *Trade and the American Dream: A Social History of Postwar Trade Policy* (Lexington, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Position Paper: United States Delegation to the GATT Intersessional Committee Meeting on April 14, 1960, College Park: N[ational] A[rchives] R[ecords] A[dministration] RG59, Lot File: O[ffice of the] A[ssistant] L[egal] A[dvisor] for E[conomic] A[ffairs], R[ecords] R[elating to] T[rade] and G[ATT] 1947–1966, Box 7, file: GATT- Common Market.

<sup>13</sup> T. W. Zeiler, *American Trade and Power in the 1960s* (New York, 1992), 1, 244–5.

<sup>14</sup> D. A. Deese, *World Trade Politics: Power, Principles, and Leadership* (London and New York, 2008), 13, 58, 67. Wendy Asbeek-Brusse also asserted that there had been a levelling of power, and a change in the relationship between the US and EEC, in her studies of the first stages of European integration. See *Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947–1957* (New York, 1997), 142.

<sup>15</sup> J. Gillingham has written a history of this particular initiative. See *Coal, steel and the rebirth of Europe 1945–1955: the Germans and French from the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge and New York, 1991).

<sup>16</sup> The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, 10 May 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1950*, iii, 695 Washington, D.C., 1977.

<sup>17</sup> The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State, 25 Oct. 1950, *FRUS 1950*, iii, 761–65; P. Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (Basingstoke, 1993), 22.

<sup>18</sup> Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 8 Dec. 1950, *FRUS 1950*, iii, 764.

<sup>19</sup> Memo by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs (Metzger) to the Deputy Legal Adviser (Tate), 25 Feb. 1953 re: Renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and Related Problems – A Current Appraisal, *FRUS 1952–1954*, i (Washington 1983): General Economic and Political Matters, 150; Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, 23 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, iii, 705; J. Evans, *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: the Twilight of the GATT?* (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 54.

<sup>20</sup> *European Coal and Steel Community: Statement by the Netherlands Government*, 8 Sept. 1952, WTO, L/17.

<sup>21</sup> Indian delegation to Seventh Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT, Report, New Delhi: N[ational] A[rchives of] I[ndia], Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Tariff

Branch, 52 (2) TB/53, Report of the Indian Delegation to the Seventh Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Examination of.

<sup>22</sup> Working party 4 on the European Coal and Steel Community: Statement by the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Tenth Meeting of the Seventh Session, 29 Oct. 1952, WTO, W.7/47.

<sup>23</sup> Summary Record of the third meeting, 6 Oct. 1952, 3pm re: European Coal and Steel Community, 9 Oct. 1952, WTO, SR.7/3.

<sup>24</sup> The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Eighth Session of the GATT (Brown) to the Chairman (Waugh), 24 Oct. 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, i, 167.

<sup>25</sup> Indian delegation to Seventh Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT.

<sup>26</sup> Summary Record of the 17<sup>th</sup> Meeting, 10 Nov. 1952, 10am, WTO, SR.17/7.

<sup>27</sup> Note: 7ième session des parties contractantes à l'Accord Générale sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce, 1 dec. 1952 [Florence:] H[istorical] A[rchives of the] E[uropean] U[nion], MAEF 000067, Olivier Wormser Papers, reel 157.

<sup>28</sup> For a general history of the EEC see D. Dinan, Europe Recast: a History of the European Union (Boulder, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> G. Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford, 1998).

<sup>30</sup> R. Marjolin, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-1986, trans. W. Hall, (London, 1989), 317, 341.

<sup>31</sup> Letter from Tuthill to Wormser, 11 Dec. 1956, NARA, RG84, P[aris] E[mbassy] G[eneral] R[ecords] 1956-58, Box 6, file 500: France European Integration 1956-57.

<sup>32</sup> Memo of Conversation, 17 Dec. 1956 re: Common Market: External Tariffs, NARA, RG84, PEGR 1956-58, Box 6, file 500: France European Integration 1956-57. Certainly the other five governments expected to submit the draft to the GATT prior to ratification. Projet d'exposé par M. P. A. Forthomme sur le marché commun européen, n.d. Paris, M[inistère des] A[ffaires] E[xtérieures], A[ffaires] E[conomiques et] F[inancières], Coopération Economique 1945-60, #34.

<sup>33</sup> Letter, Executive Secretary of GATT (White) to John Leddy, 18 July 1956, FRUS 1955-57, ix (Washington 1987), 201-2.

<sup>34</sup> Wyndham White, 'The Achievements of the GATT'.

<sup>35</sup> Letter, Executive Secretary of GATT (White) to Leddy, 18 July 1956.

<sup>36</sup> Note of a meeting with Mr. Eric Wyndham White, Executive Secretary of the G.A.T.T., nd, [Kew: The National Archives], TNA (PRO), B[oard of] T[rade] 11/5628; F. M. B. Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London & New York, 1997), chapter 9.

<sup>37</sup> Marjolin, *Architect*, 295-6.

<sup>38</sup> Summary of Speeches made by Ministers or Representatives of Ministers during Ministerial Meeting, twelfth session, TNA (PRO), CAB21 (Cabinet Papers)/4720.

<sup>39</sup> Note a.s. incompatibilité du Marché Commun avec l'Accord Général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (G.A.T.T.), 30 Avril 1957, MAE, AEF, Coopération Economique 1945-1960, #34.

<sup>40</sup> Position des Six au sein du GATT, 2 mai 1957, MAE, AEF, Coopération Economique 1945-60, #34.

<sup>41</sup> Geneva to External, 2 May 1957, LAC, RG19/4206/8718-08; Note a.s. incompatibilité du Marché Commun avec l'Accord Général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (G.A.T.T.).

<sup>42</sup> Geneva to External, 19 May 1958, LAC, RG19: F-2/4208/8718-04.

<sup>43</sup> Canadian Permanent Mission, Geneva to USSEA, GATT and the European Community, 11 Aug. 1958, LAC, RG20 [Department of Trade and Commerce], A-3/2524/4-581-20 pt. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Summary of Talks with British on 9 Oct. 1957, NARA, RG59, OALAEA, RRTG 1947-1966, Box 7, file: GATT-Common Market.

<sup>45</sup> NATO Paris to External, 7 March 1958, GATT and the EEC, LAC, RG20, A-3/2524/4-581-20 pt. 2.

<sup>46</sup> K. W. Dam, *The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization* (Chicago and London, 1970), 274-5.

<sup>47</sup> Instructions pour la Délégation Française à la Treizième session du GATT, Oct. 1958, MAE, AEF, Coopération Economique 1945-1960, #27.

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum to the Cabinet, 'Instructions for the Canadian Delegation to the Fourteenth Session of GATT', 30 April 1959, LAC: RG20/vol. 1922/20-28 pt. 7.

<sup>49</sup> Memo of Conversation re GATT Consideration of the European Common Market, 1 March 1957, NARA, RG59, OALAEA, RRTG 1947-66, Box 5, file: European Common Market (2).

<sup>50</sup> Memo of Conversation re Wyndham White Talks on the Forthcoming Intersessional Committee Meeting in Geneva, April 14 - May 3, 1958 - Common Market and the Free Trade Area, 24 March 1958, NARA, RG84, PEGR 1956-58, Box 7, file 500: European Integration 1958.

<sup>51</sup> Significance of the GATT Intersessional Committee Meeting, April 14 - May 2, 1958, NARA, RG59, B[ureau of] E[uropean] A[ffairs], O[ffice of] E[uropean] R[egional] A[ffairs], Political-Economic Numeric File 1957-63, Box 4/file 4.3 - Common Market - GATT Intersessional (Incoming Telegrams) (1958).

<sup>52</sup> Norwood to Frank, 7 May 1958, RG59, BEA, OERA, Political-Economic Numeric File 1957-1960, Box 4, file 4.3: Common Market - GATT Intersessional (Incoming Telegrams) (1958).

<sup>53</sup> Note of a meeting with Mr. Eric Wyndham White, Executive Secretary of G.A.T.T., n.d., TNA (PRO), BT11/5628.

<sup>54</sup> Washington to External, 12 March 1958, EEC: Association of Overseas Territories, LAC, RG20, A-3/2524/4-581-20 pt. 2.

<sup>55</sup> Télégramme, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières à l'Ambassade Washington, 16 Mai 1958, HAEU, MAEF000068, reel 158.

<sup>56</sup> Corse to Tuthill, 22 May 1958, NARA, RG59, BEA, OERA, Political-Economic Numeric File 1957-1960, Box 4, file 4.3: Common Market - GATT Intersessional (Incoming Telegrams) (1958).



<sup>57</sup> Geneva to External, 19 May 1958, LAC, RG19, F-2/4208/8718-04.

<sup>58</sup> Letter, Myerson, Office of European Regional Affairs, to Corse, US Mission to the European Communities, 10 June 1958, NARA, RG59, BEA, OERA, Political-Economic Numeric File 1957–1960, 4.3: Common Market – GATT Intersessional (Incoming Telegrams) (1958).

<sup>59</sup> Article XXII Consultations on Tobacco and Tropical Products in Respect to Impact of Proposals in the Rome Treaty on Trade on Third Country Suppliers, evaluation by Dr. James W. Birkenhead, FAS, n.d., NARA, RG59, OALAEA, RRTG 1947-1966, Box 8, file: GATT-EEC-OTS.

<sup>60</sup> D. Auffret, Alexandre Kojève: La philosophie, l'Etat, la fin de l'Histoire (Paris, 1990), 458–9.

<sup>61</sup> Note pour Monsieur Clappier, 'Le nouveau GATT et l'Union française', 25 March 1955, HAEU, MAEF000067, reel 158.

<sup>62</sup> Lynch, France and the International Economy, chaps 6 & 7; A. Moravcsik, 'De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–70 (Part I)', Journal of Cold War Studies, ii, no. 2 (2000), 3–43 and '(Part 2)', Journal of Cold War Studies, ii, no. 3 (2000), 4–68.

<sup>63</sup> Note pour Monsieur Clappier, 'Le nouveau GATT et l'Union française'.

<sup>64</sup> Note a.s. Voyage en France d'un groupe de parlementaires américains. Les Etats-Unis et le GATT, 26 Nov. 1956, MEA, AEF, Coopération Economique 1945–60, #24.

<sup>65</sup> Rappleye to Gruin, 24 Oct. 1958 [Cambridge, MA:] H[oughton] L[ibrary, Harvard], Time Dispatches, second series.

<sup>66</sup> Note, 6 Jan. 1958, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, HAEU, MAEF000068, reel 158. In particular, setting up the CAP.

<sup>67</sup> Rappleye to Gruin.

<sup>68</sup> GATT Intersessional Committee, April 1958, LAC, RG25/7976/248/14051-1-40 pt. 1; Clarke to Plumptre, 26 May 1958, LAC, RG19, F-2/4208/8718-04.

<sup>69</sup> Geneva to External, 19 May 1958, LAC, RG19, F-2/4208/8718-04.

<sup>70</sup> See N. P. Ludlow, 'The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU's First Major Policy', *Contemporary European History*, xiv (2005), 347–71.

<sup>71</sup> Wyndham White, 'Europe in the GATT'.

<sup>72</sup> Memo of Conversation re: Future Activities of GATT Committee II, 29 March 1960, NARA, RG59, GATT394.41/1960-63/Box172, file: 392.41/3-1860.

<sup>73</sup> Draft Report by the Acting Chairman of the delegation to the Ninth Session of the GATT (Brown), 9 March 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. ix, pp. 96, 97, 100.

<sup>74</sup> Memo of Conversation, re: Future Activities of GATT Committee II, 29 March 1960, NARA, RG59, GATT394.41/1960-63/Box172, file: 394.41/3-1860.

<sup>75</sup> Official Report of the United States Delegation to GATT Committee II on Expansion of Trade (6–20 Oct. 1960), 21 Nov. 1960, NARA, RG59, GATT 394.41, 1960-63/Box 716, file: 394.41/11-1560.

<sup>76</sup> Déclaration du porte-parole de la Communauté Economique Européenne concernant l'Association Européenne de Libre-Echange (point XII de l'ordre du jour de la XVIème sessions des Parties Contractantes), 17 May 1960, HAEU: BAC61 (EEC and ECSC Commissions), 1982–24, pt. 3; Evans, *The Kennedy Round*, 57.

<sup>77</sup> The GATT spent much time deliberating over these two regional entities. But as Bhagwati et al have noted, by the end of the 1960s regionalism had 'virtually died', leaving the EEC and EFTA as the two principal regional trade blocs. *Trading Blocs*, eds. Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, 10.

<sup>78</sup> Memo by Rashish, 'For Discussion at Meeting of Trade Negotiations Subcommittee, 29 Oct. 1963' [Boston] J[ohn] F. K[ennedy] L[ibrary], Herter Papers, Box 7, file Committee for Economic Development, 5/63-11/63.

<sup>79</sup> Brussels to External, 20 Jan. 1961 re: Tariff Conference-Art XXIV (6) Negotiations and London to External, 20 Jan. 1961 re: Tariff Conference Article XXIV (6), LAC, RG20, A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 8.

<sup>80</sup> Brussels to External, 28 April 1961 re: Art XXIV (6) Renegotiations, LAC, RG20, A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 10.

<sup>81</sup> Washington to External, 19 Jan. 1961 re: Tariff Conference Art XXIV (6), LAC, RG20, A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 8.2.

<sup>82</sup> Proceedings of the Eighth Meeting, 17 Feb. 1961, WTO, TN 60/S.R. 8. The representative for Indonesia was the only one as upbeat as the Americans.

<sup>83</sup> Brussels to External, 1 Feb. 1961 re: Art XXIV (6) Renegotiations – New Offers of EEC, LAC, RG20, A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 9; Tarif Del to External, 9 May 1961 re: Art XXIV (6) Renegotiations: Donne's Statement, LAC, RG20, A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 10

<sup>84</sup> Tarif Del to External, 1 May 1961 re: Tariff Negotiations-Negotiations with the Six and Beginning of Dillon Round, RG 20: A-3/2525/4-581-20 pt. 10.

<sup>85</sup> Telegram, Embassy in Japan to Consulate General in Geneva, 12 July 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, ix (Washington 1995), 472.

<sup>86</sup> Letter from Ball to Freeman, 11 Dec. 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, ix, 506.

<sup>87</sup> UK delegation GATT (Cohen) to Lord Home, 5 March 1962, TNA (PRO), FO371/164425.

<sup>88</sup> Conclusions de la XXIème Réunion du comité de Directeurs de la Politique Commerciale, Brussels, 26 Apr. 1962, HAEU: BAC001/1967-84.

<sup>89</sup> Cohen to Lord Home, EFTA223, 5 March 1962, FO371/164425.

<sup>90</sup> F. Costigliola, 'The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe', *Diplomatic History*, viii (1984), 227-51.

<sup>91</sup> Norwood was paraphrasing Kennedy; cited in A. E. Eckes, Jr. (ed), *Revisiting US Trade Policy: Decisions in Perspective* (Athens, 2000), 49.

<sup>92</sup> The TEA also permitted the elimination of a tariff on items where the EEC and the US accounted for 80 per cent of world exports and the elimination of impediments to tropical exports from poorer countries which were not produced in abundance in the US.

<sup>93</sup> Blumenthal in Eckes, *Revisiting*, 71. Herter had made it clear to congress in 1961 that he believed trade had to be used to strengthen links between the US and Europe. See 'A New Look at Foreign Economic Policy in Light of the Cold War and the Extension of the Common Market in Europe', by C. A. Herter and W. L. Clayton, presented to Sub-

committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1961, HL, Herter Papers, File 106.

<sup>94</sup> E. H. Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (Washington, D.C., 1970), 4. The CER was phased in from 1959–68.

<sup>95</sup> Note a.s. négociation Kennedy, 20 mai 1963, MAE, AEF, Coopération Economiques 1961–66, #930; L. Coppolaro has also made this point. See ‘Trade and Politics Across the Atlantic: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States of America in the GATT Negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1962–1967)’, (PhD dissertation, Florence, 2006), 125.

<sup>96</sup> Memo for Governor Herter, re: results of the Second Meeting of the GATT Working party, 29 Apr. 1963, NARA, RG59, Box 4, file: Foreign Trade 1963. FT7/Tariff Negotiations GATT.

<sup>97</sup> Memo of Conversation, Hallstein and Tuthill, 20 May 1963, HAEU, J[ean] M[onnet] A[merican] S[ources]/ 95.

<sup>98</sup> Tuthill to Ball, 20 May 1963, HAEU, JMAS/95.

<sup>99</sup> Memo by Rashish, ‘For Discussion at Meeting of Trade Negotiations Subcommittee, 29 Oct 1963.’

<sup>100</sup> Coppolaro, ‘Trade and Politics’, 123; R. Marjolin, *Architect*, 303–4. Marjolin reported that during the Kennedy round, he and Jean Rey took their instructions from the Council of Ministers, 344; According to D. Dinan, the Council of Ministers was deliberately opaque and secretive until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (Boulder, 1994), 246.

<sup>101</sup> Memo by Rashish, ‘For Discussion at Meeting of Trade Negotiations Subcommittee, 29 Oct. 1963.’

<sup>102</sup> Ball complained of the inability of the commission to play ‘its proper role’ and that it sided ‘with the most restrictive French view in any showdown’. Hinton to Tuthill, 26 June 1963, HAEU, JMAS/95.

<sup>103</sup> Bohlen to Herter, 15 Apr. 1964, HL, Herter papers, file 52; Memo: Myerson to the Ambassador, ‘The Future of the GATT’, 17 June 1963, HAEU: JMAS/95. In fact, their

influence began to wane during the Kennedy round. Clappier went to the Bank of France in 1964 as a deputy governor. Wormser was appointed ambassador at Moscow in 1966. Kojève died in 1968.

<sup>104</sup> Coppolaro, 'Trade and Politics', 74, 131.

<sup>105</sup> Visit of Chancellor Erhard of Germany, Dec. 28-29, 1963, Talking Points for the President on Trade Negotiations, 20 Dec. 1963, NARA, RG59, R[ecords of] C[omponent] O[ffices of the] B[ureau of] E[conomic] A[ffairs] 1941-1963, Box 3, file: Economic Affairs (Gen), E7 Visits, July-Dec 1963; GATT Negotiations (world), Zim to Bermingham, 23 May 1963, HL, Time Dispatches, second series, Box 32, file 612; Ludlow, 'The Making of the CAP', 362.

<sup>106</sup> GATT Negotiations ADD (world), Bermingham to Zim, 24 May 1963, HL, Time Dispatches, second series, Box 32, file 612.

<sup>107</sup> Zim to Bermingham, 23 May 1963, re: GATT Negotiations (World), HL, Time Dispatches, second series, 1956-1968.

<sup>108</sup> Memo, Norwood to Roth re Definitive Acceptance of GATT, 2 Oct. 1963, JFKL, Herter Papers, Box 9, file GATT Trade Negotiations, 5/20/63-3/9/64; Burgh to Jardine (BT), 12 June 1963 and Memo, 'The French and G.A.T.T.' by D. O'Connell, 21 June 1963, both in TNA (PRO), FO371/172328.

<sup>109</sup> Geneva to FO, 14 June 1963, TNA (PRO), FO371/172328.

<sup>110</sup> Telegram from Mason, 8 July 1963, TNA (PRO), FO371/172328.

<sup>111</sup> Dixon to Reilly, 29 March and 8 May 1963, TNA (PRO), FO371/172328. Reilly was less certain that the French would participate in the Kennedy Round 'only to destroy it', Reilly to Rumbold, 6 Aug. 1963, TNA (PRO), FO371/172328.

<sup>112</sup> J. W. Young, Britain and European Unity 1945-1999, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Basingstoke, 2000). As Young put it, 'the public humiliation of a veto was a major blow to Britain's international standing, to Conservative confidence, and to Macmillan's premiership', 77.

<sup>113</sup> Letter and briefing papers from William R. Tyler to Mr. Johnson, 'Your appointment with the Netherlands State Secretary for European Affairs', 28 Jan. 1964, NARA, RG59, Lot File: RCOBEA, 1941-1963, Box 3/Economic Affairs (Gen), E7 Visits, July-Dec. 1963; N.P. Ludlow, 'The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-weight: The Kennedy Round

Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, xviii (2007), 362-3.

<sup>114</sup> Memo of Telephone Conversation, Governor Herter and Undersecretary of State Ball, 21 Nov. 1963, JFKL, Memorandum of telephone conversations, 8/1/63-9/15/64. This confidence persisted for some time. See: Background Paper, 'French Attitude Toward the Kennedy Round', 3/11/64, JFKL, Herter Papers, Box 7, file Ambassador Charles Bohlen.

<sup>115</sup> J. M. Myerson to the Ambassador, 'The Future of the GATT', 17 June 1963, HAEU, JMAS/95. Soutou has also noted that an Atlanticist outlook was not as strongly rooted in France as the rest of Western Europe. As a result, the connection between the Kennedy round and fortifying the Atlantic community was not as compelling in France as for the other five. 'France and the Cold War, 1944-1963', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, xii, no. 4 (2001), 43.

<sup>116</sup> EEC and Trade Negotiations, background paper re: Vice President's Visit to the Benelux Countries, Nov. 3-10, 1963, NARA, RG59, Lot File: RCOBEA 1941-1963, Box 3, file: Economic Affairs (Gen), E7 Visits, July-Dec. 1963; Winand, Eisenhower, p. 341.

<sup>117</sup> Visit of Chancellor Erhard of Germany, Dec. 28-29, 1963, Talking Points for the President on Trade Negotiations, 20 Dec. 1963, NARA, RG59, RCOBEA 1941-1963, Box 3, file: Economic Affairs (Gen), E7 Visits, July-Dec 1963.

<sup>118</sup> C. A. Herter, 'U.S. Aims in the Kennedy Round', *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, ii, no. 2 (1964), pp. 240, 246; T.W. Zeiler, 'Commanding the Middle Ground: The American Agenda at the Kennedy Round', *Australian Economic History Review*, xli, no. 3 (2001), 310.

<sup>119</sup> Memo for the President, 'The Trade Negotiations', 27 Nov. 1963, JFKL, Herter Papers, file Memorandum to the President, 4/8/63-12/14/66 (folder 2).

<sup>120</sup> Several scholars have studied the round closely: Evans, *The Kennedy Round*, Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats* and T. W. Zeiler, *American Trade and Power in the 1960s* (New York, 1992).

<sup>121</sup> L. Coppolaro, 'The Empty Chair Crisis and the Kennedy Round of GATT Negotiations (1962-1967)', in J.M. Palayret, H. Wallace, and P. Winand, eds, *Visions, Votes and*

Veto: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On (Brussels & New York, 2006), 219–39.

<sup>122</sup> Zeiler, *American Trade*, 236–7.

<sup>123</sup> Memo for the President from Herter, 'The Trade Negotiations', 27 Nov. 1963, JFKL, Herter Papers, Memorandum to the President 4/8/63–12/14/66 (folder 2).

<sup>124</sup> Eckes, *Revisiting*, p. 83.

<sup>125</sup> Memo of Conversation (with Robert Marjolin) re: Post Luxembourg, 11 Feb. 1965 and Tuthill to Ball, 1 Feb. 1966, both in NARA, RG59, Lot File: BEA, O[ffice of the] OECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Subject files 1961–1975, Box 3, file: E-4, Kennedy Round 1966–1967.

<sup>126</sup> Dryden, *Trade Warriors*, 113; E. Mahan, *Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe* (Basingstoke, 2002), 106.

<sup>127</sup> Zeiler's excellent account of the origins of GATT in *Free Trade, Free World* recounts the struggle between a freer trading US versus an imperial-minded and protectionist UK. James Miller offers a stimulating revision to this interpretation, arguing that trade multilateralism combined 'American idealism and British pragmatism'. 'Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 1939–1945: The Impact of Anglo-American Trade Policy Negotiations' (PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 2003), 1; J. Goldstein, 'The United States and World Trade: Hegemony by Proxy?', in T. C. Lawton, J. N. Rosenau, and A. C. Verdun, eds, *Strange Power: Shaping the parameters of international relations and international political economy* (Ashgate, 2000), 246–72.

<sup>128</sup> Memo by Rashish, 'For Discussion at Meeting of Trade Negotiations Subcommittee, 29 Oct. 1963'; Ludlow, 'The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-weight', 353.

<sup>129</sup> 'An American View of European Unity', 3 June 1967, RG59, Lot File: BEA, OOECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Subject Files 1961–1970, Box 12, file B. 1b US/Pol 3 Organizations and Alignments – European Integration 1967.

<sup>130</sup> A British official pointed out that even though the US cheated in GATT they were still committed members of the organization. See minute by Barnes, 27 Oct. 1959 re: 'The G.A.T.T.', BT11/5771. Zeiler has reached a similar conclusion about the way protectionism was managed in the US to permit slow and steady progress towards

trade liberalization. See ‘Managing Protectionism: American Trade Policy in the Early Cold War’, *Diplomatic History*, xxii (Summer 1998), 339.

<sup>131</sup> J. G. Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order’, *International Regimes*, ed. Krasner, 209.

<sup>132</sup> Finlayson and Zacher, ‘The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers’, 279–80.

<sup>133</sup> Ludlow, ‘The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-weight’, 354

<sup>134</sup> Review of the work of the contracting parties and future program, Statement by the Rt. Hon. J. R. Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Overseas Trade of New Zealand on 23 Nov. 1967, WTO, W.24/56.

<sup>135</sup> Dam gives much credit to the GATT Secretariat for the organization's transformation from a ‘humble’ and ‘deprived’ organization into a leading international entity. The GATT, 335. Eichengreen and Kenen similarly conclude that post-war international organizations like the GATT succeeded because ‘they effectively combined rigidity and flexibility’. B. Eichengreen and P. B. Kenen, ‘Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview’ in P. B. Kenen (ed), *Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods* (Washington, 1994), 4. Also see p. 7 about the importance of adaptability to the effectiveness of international organizations.

---

## Additional information

### Notes on contributors

Francine McKenzie

I am grateful to Tom Zeiler, Al Eckes, Kathy Rasmussen, Lucia Coppolaro, Thomas Gijswijt, Kim Nossal and Mike Szonyi for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 410-2007-2502.

---





Time is research – publish today in

## Advances in Nineteenth-Century Research

**FIND OUT MORE »**

### Related research

People also read

Recommended articles

Cited by  
6

## Information for

Authors

R&D professionals

Editors

Librarians

Societies

## Opportunities

Reprints and e-prints

Advertising solutions

Accelerated publication

Corporate access solutions

## Open access

Overview

Open journals

Open Select

Dove Medical Press

F1000Research

## Help and information

Help and contact

Newsroom

All journals

Books

## Keep up to date

Register to receive personalised research and resources by email



Sign me up



Copyright © 2025 Informa UK Limited [Privacy policy](#) [Cookies](#) [Terms & conditions](#)

[Accessibility](#)

 Taylor and Francis Group

Registered in England & Wales No. 01072954  
5 Howick Place | London | SW1P 1WG