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
Original Articles

# Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales: Explaining Changes in How the US Enforces Economic Sanctions

Bryan R. Early & Keith A. Preble

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pursuing fewer cases but imposing enormous fines during Barack Obama's administration. Our analysis indicates that the shift in foreign policy emphasis from Cuba to Iran during the Bush administration and how that motivated new legislation to enhance penalties for violating sanctions paved the way for the OFAC to adopt its innovative whale-hunting strategy during the Obama administration. Our study also yields a wealth of new empirical insights into how the United States enforces its sanctions that can contribute to future theory-building efforts.

## Acknowledgments

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## Disclosure statement

The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.

## Notes

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Keith A. Preble

Keith A. Preble is a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at the University at Albany, SUNY. He conducts research on and has published policy works on economic sanctions.

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