







Q

Home ▶ All Journals ▶ Economics, Finance & Business ▶ The European Journal of Finance ▶ Lis
▶ Volume 24, Issue 18 ▶ The impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preve ....

List of Issues

The European Journal of Finance > Volume 24, 2018 - <u>Issue 18</u>

232 6 0

Views CrossRef citations to date Altmetric

**Articles** 


# The impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 repo 'safe harbor' provisions on investors

Justin Chircop 🔀 📵 , Michele Fabrizi & Antonio Parbonetti

Pages 1772-1798 | Received 22 Nov 2016, Accepted 09 Jan 2018, Published online: 02 Feb 2018

**66** Cite this article

▶ https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2018.1427608



Sample our
Economics, Finance,
Business & Industry Journals
>> Sign in here to start your access
to the latest two volumes for 14 days

Full A

Repri

**ABSTF** 

The Ban

significa

the p

extendir market i

about th

is at leas

perceive

as domii

# We Care About Your Privacy

We and our 908 partners store and access personal data, like browsing data or unique identifiers, on your device. Selecting I Accept enables tracking technologies to support the purposes shown under we and our partners process data to provide. Selecting Reject All or withdrawing your consent will disable them. If trackers are disabled, some content and ads you see may not be as relevant to you. You can resurface this menu to change your choices or withdraw consent at any time by clicking the Show Purposes link on the bottom of the webpage .Your choices will have effect within our Website. For more details, refer to our Privacy Policy. Here

We and our partners process data to provide:

Use precise geolocation data. Actively scan device

I Accept

Reject All

Show Purpose

2005

Bankruptcy

ews about

nce

on equity

events

sis suggests

rs

r' provisions

we find that

the promulgation of BAPCPA gave rise to increased information asymmetry for banks with repo exposure.

### **KEYWORDS:**

Repurchase agreements bankruptcy code safe harbor

### JEL CLASSIFICATIONS:

m41 g21 g32

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

# **ORCID**

Securitie

RBC Cap

Securitie

Justin Chircop <a href="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5235-8077">http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5235-8077</a>

# Notes 1 As of A Bank of Securitie Inc., Bank J.P. Morg

X

nal, Inc.,

TD

2 The Ba disafe harbor's ally 1984.

3 Finance risk is sometimes referred to as roll-over risk. It is the risk that repo financing is not rolled over on maturity. Moreover, repos expose companies to counterparty risk. This risk refers to the possibility that the counterparty either fails to satisfy margin calls or fails to honour the agreement to repurchase the underlying assets.

4 We acknowledge that the ideal control group for our difference-in-differences analysis would be composed of banks to which all regulations except for the BAPCPA regulations relating to repo transactions apply. This control group does not exist since all US banks fall within the scope of the BAPCPA.


5 Sometimes provisions are inserted in the repurchase agreement which prohibits the sale and/or rehypothecation of the collateral to third parties.

6 SFAS 140, 'Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities' was issued in September 2000. It was amended by SFAS 166 (FASB 2009) 'Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140' and more recently FASB issued Accounting Standard Updated (ASU) 2014–2011 Transfers and Servicing (Topic 860) (FASB 2014) 'Repurchase-to Maturity Transactions, Repurchase Financings, and Disclosures' which expand disclosures on repurchase agreements.

7 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §907, X 8 Vide Ta ssage of the Bankrup 9 The us or example, Bushee uck (<u>2005</u>) and Ali the 10 A difference V REPO e the separate associat ge out the d the magnitu market

11 Varia

- 12 Variable bhck4340 of the FRY-9C statements.
- 13 Variable bhck7205 of the FRY-9C statements.
- 14 In untabulated results we obtain the same inferences when we run the analyses without winsorizing the data.
- 15 Further detail on this approach is provided in Sefcik and Thompson (1986).
- 16 Prior to data refinement that is based on the Sefcik and Thompson (<u>1986</u>) adjustment we have 459 unique bank holding companies. Thus, the use of the Sefcik and Thompson (<u>1986</u>) adjustment leads to the loss of 10 banks.
- 17 We recognize that due to limited data availability we are unable to control for the type of repo agreements the company engages into. As previously discussed it is only after ASU 2014–2011 became effective in 2015, that companies were required to disclose detailed information about the type of repo agreements they engage in.
- 18 Given that the choice of the beginning and end of sample period is 'ad-hoc' in robustness tests we test for the sensitivity of our results to this research design choice.
- 19 The economic significance is calculated as the coefficient on the interaction term (0.0019) divided by the mean SPR for the sample (0.00248).



Information for Open access **Authors** Overview R&D professionals Open journals Editors **Open Select** Librarians **Dove Medical Press** Societies F1000Research Opportunities Help and information Reprints and e-prints Advertising solutions Newsroom Accelerated publication Corporate access solutions Books Keep up to date Register to receive personalised research and resources by email Sign me up X or & Francis Group Copyright