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Introduction

Lisa K. Bates

Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA

Over the past year, taxi drivers around the world have protested the appearance of ride-hailing apps Uber and Lyft, creating massive traffic slowdowns in London, Warsaw, Hong Kong, Paris, and Berlin. In the most extreme and tragic incidents, some taxi drivers have committed suicide publicly, naming economic desperation brought on by competition with app services as the reason. Proponents of the platform apps point to consumer convenience and lower (albeit heavily subsidized) costs, blaming the excessive regulation of the taxicab industry for its stagnation, but rarely speak to the cost for driver workers. Meanwhile, the ride-hail companies are fighting legal challenges around the world over using 'freelance' contracts to circumvent labour laws. As Uber and Lyft make their IPO debut on the stock exchange, drivers for the services in the U.S. have staged a strike, asking customers to boycott the apps in support of their protests about minimum pay and their status as independent contractors, not employees with full benefits and protections. Whether working for the disrupter or disrupted, the people providing the actual labour of driving customers are trying to address working conditions.

Interface and the world's impacts on neighborhoods and practitioners as they define work and the sharing economy as employment. The study



Zwick and interviews of work, and what researchers in the U.S. and Spicer's study suggest

points out that as cities accept the 'disruptive' ride-hail apps' presence despite their attempts to evade regulation, immigrant drivers in Los Angeles who were called 'bandits' are facing deteriorating wages with increased competition, while still being considered illegal. Kerzhner, considering home-sharing via Airbnb, asks the question; what work happens when the platform doesn't acknowledge workers at all? While there are explicit debates about the drivers for ride-hail services, the hosts of Airbnb are a hidden labour force. The job of readying, renting, and resetting rooms and units often falls to women, whose efforts are under-compensated and may even disrupt formal employment.

As Baber argues, these shifts towards flexible or 'gig' jobs are growing much more significantly with the rise of platforms during a moment when there are many workers looking to supplement unstable or low-paying jobs. The gig economy, she notes, benefits platform companies far more than it does workers or cities. Green takes this argument further to make the case for planners, specifically, to be far more active in the debate over platform apps as employers with responsibilities to labour, not just as go-betweens for customers and independent contractors. He views the question of jobs as integral to economic development, with planners taking a lead role envisioning equitable and sustainable urban economies. Finally, activist and practitioner dominic t. moulden describes the project of worker cooperatives - both in his organization in

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Blight or Remedy: Understanding Ridehailing’s Role in the Precarious “Gig Economy”

Austin Zwick^a and Zachary Spicer^b

^aSyracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA; ^bWestern University, London, Ontario, Canada

A new form of industrial relations, the ‘Gig Economy’, has rapidly displaced traditional labor-employment relations. In this new gig economy, firms, predominantly those with digital origins, are dependent upon the fleeting hired help of independent contractors, where employment is now often measured in minutes. There is no industry that embodies this scenario better than ride-hailing, the platform economy transportation-for-hire service in which Uber holds over two-thirds of the US market-share as of December 2018 (Molla, 2018).

With all the criticism of platform firms, like Uber, we set out to understand why workers willingly enter into precarious employment arrangements, particularly in a strong economy where there is often little shortage of alternative employment opportunities that offer more stability. When asking Uber drivers about their past and current employment, along with their future ambitions, however, we began to notice an odd pattern:

(Zwick, 2018). This pattern is consistent with the findings of Molla (2015), who found that platform workers often view their employment as a necessary evil, a means to an end, rather than a career opportunity. This is particularly true for those who are facing economic hardship or who are seeking to gain experience in a new industry. The platform economy has created a new form of labor market segmentation, where workers are often employed in precarious conditions with little job security and few benefits. This has led to a growing concern among policymakers and researchers about the impact of the platform economy on the labor market and on the well-being of workers. The question of how to address these issues is a complex one, and one that requires a nuanced understanding of the platform economy and the role of workers within it.

Why do workers willingly enter into precarious employment arrangements?

We decided to investigate this question by conducting a series of interviews with Uber drivers in London, Ontario, Canada. We began by asking them about their current employment situation and how they had come to work for Uber. We then asked them about their past employment history and what they had learned from that experience. Finally, we asked them about their future ambitions and what they thought would be necessary to achieve them.

Our findings suggest that workers enter into precarious employment arrangements for a variety of reasons. Some are seeking to gain experience in a new industry, while others are seeking to supplement their income. Some are facing economic hardship, while others are seeking to escape a dead-end job. The platform economy has created a new form of labor market segmentation, where workers are often employed in precarious conditions with little job security and few benefits.

Our findings also suggest that workers who enter into precarious employment arrangements often do so with a clear understanding of the risks involved. They know that their employment is precarious and that they may not have the same job security or benefits as traditional employees. However, they also know that the platform economy offers them the opportunity to work on their own terms and to earn a living. This is a trade-off that many workers are willing to make.

Our findings have important implications for policymakers and researchers. First, they suggest that the platform economy has created a new form of labor market segmentation, where workers are often employed in precarious conditions with little job security and few benefits. This has led to a growing concern among policymakers and researchers about the impact of the platform economy on the labor market and on the well-being of workers. The question of how to address these issues is a complex one, and one that requires a nuanced understanding of the platform economy and the role of workers within it.

Second, they suggest that workers who enter into precarious employment arrangements often do so with a clear understanding of the risks involved. They know that their employment is precarious and that they may not have the same job security or benefits as traditional employees. However, they also know that the platform economy offers them the opportunity to work on their own terms and to earn a living. This is a trade-off that many workers are willing to make.



require flexibility. Although through some workers' eyes, Uber appears to part of the blight spreading through the modern economy, other workers see it as a remedy for an already precarious economy. In short, the relationship between platform firms and drivers may not necessarily be always exploitative, as some may wish to portray.

The barrier to entry to driving on the Uber platform is low. In most jurisdictions, merely having a license, a smartphone, and a clean criminal record is enough to begin as an Uber driver. In some circumstances, Uber is able to provide the vehicle, or financing to acquire one, if the driver does not already own one (for a fee, of course). Some jurisdictions now require driver-training, vehicle inspections, and other government mandates to protect consumers and align this new transportation-for-hire service with pre-existing taxi regulation.

Uber provides drivers with an immense amount of flexibility in scheduling. Drivers are able to choose when they log onto and off from the platform, controlling how long and under what conditions they work. While this flexibility can be interpreted by some as negative (Bajwa et al., [2018](#)), in that those logging on to drive with Uber lack employee benefits, consistent wages, and job security – particularly in contrast to the taxi drivers that they are displacing – some drivers see the situation very differently.

From our interviews, all but two mentioned the flexibility of Uber as a central reason for

driving for Uber. Drivers value the control when they want to log on and off, and the ability to work concurrently with other jobs. Additionally, three different drivers mentioned that a third of their small business income comes from their Uber services. Uber provides new leads and customer service during their drive. The driver's pay is a percentage of the Uber. Most drivers earn an average of \$15 per hour, far less than taxi workers, and Uber drivers do not have an hourly wage. Uber drivers also have surge pricing.



often determined strategies to maximize their fares. Two different respondents mentioned they only work select shifts for Uber, morning rush-hour and late evening accordingly, to maximize surge-pricing. Another described the tactics he took to try to maximize airport trips, which tend to be longer drives with less down-time between hails. As such, many of those in our sample with some experience driving for Uber found ways to maximize their earnings, where possible, using the platform.

Most part-time drivers acknowledged that Uber was probably not a better alternative to their full-time job, but rather allowed them to quickly exchange labor for cash. For some drivers, however, Uber allowed them to move from a poorly compensated precarious job to a more consistent, higher paying one. One of the drivers interviewed, who previously worked as a Domino's pizza delivery driver, noted that he felt the work was similar, but with Uber was now working with better hours and better pay. Likewise, a former retail worker in New York City, who enjoyed the night hours, discovered he could earn a better living by driving fewer night hours to earn the same income.

We also heard that drivers appreciate the autonomy that the platform provides. One respondent recently quit his stable job as a grocery store clerk to drive full-time for Uber. He complained that his former manager often scheduled night and double-shifts for him on short-notice, and then yelled at him and threatened to fire him if he protested. Now, he enjoys shorter hours and the only 'boss' he has to report to is a smartphone. He also mentioned that his former manager had fired him a promotion and he had declined a promotion because of a heavy accent, and that he had been promoted to a position that he had to work in the app only. He also mentioned that he had made a race in the divide, the the experience up when Along the customer



experiences with customers also mentioned it was rare – and did not often last long when it did occur. One driver noted that he had only one customer use a racial slur towards him during his two years of driving for Uber. He did note, however, that customers in his previous job used similar slurs against him on a near daily basis.

The low barrier to entry makes ridesharing not only an easy job to start, but also an easy job to leave. Cook et al. (2018) found that “more than 60% of those who start driving are no longer active on the platform six months later.” Many might be taking a ‘break’ for months at a time as they found a better job, or merely a better gig. However, considering Uber constantly recruits, the vast majority probably ‘quit’ – an odd term considering they were never legally employed to begin with – soon after starting as they determined driving for the platform did not suit them. Those that we interviewed were overwhelmingly happy with the service, however, there is an obvious ‘survivor bias’ occurring. Those who were happy kept driving, while those who were not, simply stopped.

Almost every driver we interviewed, except one, had been driving for at least a year. That single exception among our sample had only joined the platform two weeks earlier. The interviewee had mixed feelings about Uber. While they openly weighed the good and the bad of working for the platform, they were unsure how long they were going to continue to drive for Uber. The respondent was impatiently waiting for something to change in the mean time.”

This sentiment was also expressed by another driver who we interviewed. They noted that their earnings were low and that on some occasions they may not be able to make a living. They also mentioned that the work is not as glamorous as it appears to be.

precautionary measures should be taken to protect the health and safety of drivers. This is especially true in the case of gig work, where there is no employer-provided safety net. It is important to understand what the risks are and how to mitigate them. This is especially true for gig workers, who are often working in isolation and may not have access to the same resources as traditional employees. It is also important to understand the legal implications of gig work, as this can vary significantly by jurisdiction. In some cases, gig workers may be considered self-employed, while in others they may be considered employees. This can have significant implications for their rights and benefits.

Our work highlights the need for further research into the experiences of gig workers and the implications of the gig economy. We hope that our findings will be helpful to researchers, policymakers, and gig workers alike.

conclusive, this brief study challenges some prevailing opinions about Uber's role in the modern economy and perhaps places the role of labor in the platform age into a different light. Ridehailing should not be instantly dismissed as a blight on the labor landscape without further exploring how operators fully utilize and potentially benefit from its existence. Furthermore, as Zwick and Spicer (2018) note, policy-makers and planners should carefully weigh all of the costs and benefits to all of their constituents prior to making any decisions about the platform economy's fate.

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structures, limiting many aspects of daily and personal life, including curtailing opportunities for other employment.

The value and impact of this shift is only beginning to be understood. Questions of individual physical and emotional labour, unequal dispersion of benefits and impacts on long-term employment and social mobility can be considered in tandem with the questions of the impact on the city. As jobs and incomes are increasing variable, unreliable and unprotected, and each job – whether through a platform or an employer – is insufficient to make a living, the relative flexibility of gigs is becoming especially attractive in the ability to meld it around other work and other responsibilities, such as child or elder care, education or health needs – and in the case of home-sharing, with a basic need for housing.

Homeshares for Fun and Profit

Airbnb and similar platforms have met with widespread criticism for turning homes serving long-term residents, into hotel rooms serving tourists, raising rents and home prices and furthering displacement and gentrification. Research shows that Airbnb income is driven primarily by commercial Airbnb, entire units using the platform to operate as unregulated hostels or hotels, with no permanent residents and no ‘host’.

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otherwise would stay empty. Interactions with guests are presented as being cost-less or even valuable.

Even as cities move to restrict or ban Airbnb, provisions are made for home-sharing and hosting to continue. In Berlin, a ban enforced by 100,000 Euro fines applies only to commercial renters – partially owner-occupied rentals are entirely exempt. San Francisco has limited short-term rentals to 90 days per year – unless owner-occupied. Santa Monica has banned whole-home rentals, but continues to allow home-sharing. Boston's tax for entire homes in the short rentals market is \$1000, but only \$25 for shared home rentals. (AirDNA, [2017](#))

I would argue, however, that the home-sharing side of the practice too deserves consideration through the lens of de-formalizing urban labour and spiralling housing costs. Short-term rentals are more profitable than long-term ones, and it is necessary to identify, characterize and quantify this added value. It appears to emerge from the shorter lease (and thus higher risk to the lessee), but also in the furnishing and setting up of the existing household, the ease of access and marketing of the space, and the booking, directing, meeting, explaining, hosting and cleaning of it. In other words, the labour of the Airbnb host.

For some Airbnb hosts, this labour may be marginal, and even, as intended, desirable. However, for many, it is a significant and often physically demanding and laborious task that involves many hours of their time and energy. This is often done in their home as a genuine and often unpaid activity.

For renters, the ability to rent from Airbnb allows them to avoid the costs of long-term leases and prefer to rent from Airbnb. This would allow them to earn the income from their property without having to spend a significant time and physical effort on the part of the host.

Embodied in the practice of home-sharing is the idea that a person has to turn up and host guests. This is often true;




no face-to-face human interaction, rendering the 'host' an entirely digital presence. Who are the hosts taking advantage of this kind of reduction of labour and disembodiment? It is precisely the small, 'authentic' hosts, who rent out spaces in their own homes, who have not entirely automated the process and must maintain an embodied presence to handle both the logistical and emotional interactions with their guests/customers. This labour and these interactions require closer scrutiny in order for us to understand the implications for Airbnb hosts' lives, particularly with regard to gender, age, class, family status, other employment and their own housing status.

My preliminary interviews suggest some troubling hypotheses. Being able to maintain a full Airbnb schedule requires a combination of flexible and part-time employment, the shifting about and even skipping of paid work, and drawing extensively on favours and social capital from family and friends. (At the same time, it is never, on its own, sufficient to make a living.) Emotional and social labour – performances of friendliness, hospitality, cleanliness, homeliness, authenticity, elegance and constant availability – are also crucial to maintaining good reviews and thus being able to continue to draw visitors.

Women appear to be required to dedicate more labour, and make more allowances, in this regard. A wide body of literature identifies feminized, embodied labour practices requiring an emotional and social presence, and it is unsurprising that Airbnb hosting fits this pattern. Women are also more likely to be in precarious employment situations.

Some hosts – through their location and aesthetic with its target market – are able to earn, either through greater expense or greater efforts, a higher price for their listings at a cheaper rate. This is an asymptotic process.

Hosts in precarious employment situations are more likely to be viewed – and thus to be able to maintain their listings – as 'authentic' and 'friendly'.



passed up interviewing for 9-5 jobs and risked losing their jobs through lateness and poor preparation caused by the need to take care of unpredictable and stressful Airbnb guests. In the long term, they might be forced to reorient their professional trajectories, struggling to balance the requirements of good hosting with already precarious employment situations. It is difficult to assess the hourly value of Airbnb work but – thanks to bloated rents and deflated wages – it may in practice be more remunerative than work requiring more education, having higher status and greater potential for social mobility.

The Price of the City

At its most extreme, this re-emergence of the labour-intensive housekeeper role, particularly amongst women, may be translating high rents into stymied career progress and even long-term labour market disadvantage. In the short term, Airbnb is an expression of the gig economy, part of the pattern of de-formalized employment, where workers must carry risk without any potential return on investment. Renting Airbnb space is becoming another arrow in a quiver of income strategies, moving away from a ‘standard’ employment pattern of formal employment with a single employer and well defined and predictable remuneration, benefits and protections.

As McDowell observes (2011), women’s movement into the formal, salaried workplace in the se

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is precarious and conditional. For some Airbnb hosts, at least, hosting is a necessary strategy for accessing the employment, education and social opportunities of the city – but their reliance on it requires a restructuring of their lives and labour precisely in ways that limit their ability to fully take advantage of these opportunities.

Notes on contributor

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The Gentrification of ‘Sharing’: From Bandit Cab to Ride Share Tech

Anna Joo Kim

Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California, San Diego, CA

Many years ago, I worked as a taxi driver in Los Angeles, I worked for the LA Taxi Workers Alliance, the Labor-Studies Center (enter) and as a Korean ethnographer. I speak the language of the taxi drivers for the last 10 years. I am a union from the 1980s. Important



across the country. In particular, one driver's story stood out to me, and later informed the ethnographic process for my dissertation (UCLA, 2011) on the importance of Los Angeles' informal economy. More importantly it revealed that the informal economy should not be seen as a secondary, lesser, shadow network, rife with exploitation, but rather, for many, it is a critical survival (and 'thrive-al') economy that is resource rich.

The driver I met that day, 'Sam,' was a frustrated Korean immigrant in his late 40s, doing things the 'legal' way, and working as a taxi driver for a large taxi company. Sam's main frustration was that taxi drivers had a hard time earning a living wage in the structure as owner-operators for large companies, but also that as a Korean driver, he competed with people doing things the 'wrong' way - meaning a large network of Korean immigrant drivers who worked as, what were then called, 'bandit' cab drivers.

Out of respect, rather than 'bandit' cab drivers, I use the term co-ethnic drivers. Korean co-ethnic drivers work for smaller, unlicensed Korean companies in Los Angeles, giving rides exclusively within the Korean American urban and suburban spaces of Southern California. (See [Table 1](#) for a sampling of rates charged by co-ethnic Korean drivers. The table shows flat fees by location from Koreatown to the various Korean ethnoburbs of Southern California.) The term itself, 'bandit cab,' a common moniker given to this type of ride-sharing before the apps existed, tells us everything we need to know about how cities and 'official' cab companies treated both the drivers and the riders who rode with them. Many vendors Vallianat immigrat planning Lyft and clearly, inform



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Later in my work on Los Angeles' informality, I interviewed many low-wage, monolingual Korean speaking workers in Koreatown and the 'bandit' cabs came up again and again. This time, not for their illegality, but because many Korean immigrants, especially undocumented Korean immigrants, spoke of how they were able to utilize co-ethnic Korean drivers as a 'safe' mode of transportation in post 9-11 Los Angeles. When buses became targets of ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and taxis remained too expensive, using underground Korean drivers were the ways in which immigrants learned to 'ride-share' - before ride-sharing apps existed.

"The taxi system here is set up really well here [Koreatown, LA] - though of course the taxi system is illegal, too. Yellow cab or legal cabbies are really expensive; tick, tick, tick, the prices go up. My cabs, I can get from home to work for about 4 or 5 dollars a trip. The buses used to have free transfers, so for a bus from work to home, I had to take two buses, but now they make you pay twice, so it's $1.50 \times 2 = \$3$ but I have to walk about 10 to 15 minutes to get home. Why should I risk that danger [of deportation] for 1 dollar when I can pay the dollar more and make sure I get home. So most people I know use these taxis. So, you know governments and cities, banning it, doesn't stop people from doing it. Because there is a need. Where there is a need people do it." - Author interview with Undocumented Korean Taxi-Rider



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The extractive sharing economy is no less exploitative than that which has always been imagined and assumed about the ethnic economy or the informal economy: that drivers are driven into the dark to a place where wages are low, hours are long, and the potential conditions exist for employers (usually 'co-ethnic' employers) to exploit linguistically isolated populations (Kim, [1999](#); Hum, [2000](#)). Some recent studies on Uber suggest that despite its visibility, the new platform economy does not offer driver-workers better working conditions. Even with a more exclusive, primarily native-born (up to 75% in the case of one study), 'driver-partners' as Uber calls its 'employees,' the


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sharing economy) may lead to more dangerous, risky or underpaid relationships within the informal sharing economy. Planning for sharing and changes to transportation policy may be helpful in opening up one end of the sharing spectrum while remaining in complete ignorance of a sizeable market for co-ethnic sharing that often continues to remain illegible and untranslated (see [Figure 2](#)). Bringing fresh attention to the 'old' ways of sharing that still exist today expands our ability to know what happens in communities that continue to have limited access to the app-based sharing economy, and also to pay attention to how sharing behaviors in some linguistically isolated communities may change as a result of the new and emergent forms of sharing.

Figure 2. Rear of business card advertising Korean Co-Ethnic Cab Services (Pricing has been translated into [Table 1](#) above).



지역	요금	
	싱글	대리
다운타운	\$9	\$20
글렌데일	\$15	\$30
파사데나	\$20	\$35
라크라센타	\$20	\$35
버뱅크	\$20	\$40
가디나	\$20	\$35
세리투스	\$25	\$45
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The 'Sharing Economy'? Precarious Labor in Neoliberal Cities

Ashley Baber

Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

The 'sharing economy' has certainly gained a lot of attention over the last few years. Through the use of app-based platforms, people have the ability to use their personal assets to gain income. With few exceptions, anyone with a suitable car, maintenance skills or extra space in their home, can gain income through Uber, TaskRabbit or Airbnb. The term 'sharing economy' seems to stem from the ability of private citizens to sell their services or assets through an internet or app-based platform. Yet, there is something crucial missing from this categorization of this emerging economy; precarious labor and the impact on cities. By calling the sale of personal assets or services the 'sharing economy', the broader processes of growing labor market precarity are obscured. The 'sharing economy' is complex and embedded with social relationships, namely the 'flexibilization' of labor. This relationship is not new, but rather rises under precarious labor market conditions within neoliberal cities as a response to economic

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Comparatively, recent advances in technology have resulted in a rapid influx of app-based platforms which provide services on-demand, sometimes referred to as 'gig' work. This emerging form of work acquisition parallels the employment relationship of the temporary help industry. Job seekers use their smart phones to access apps which allow them to pick up jobs as they become available (Healy, Nicholson & Pekarek, [2017](#)). Take for example Uber; drivers will log into their Uber app which will put them in contact with customers seeking a ride. Drivers will then 'pick up' the rider and drive them to their destination. The driver will then wait for an alert from their app for their next employment opportunity. Therefore, neither the temp nor gig worker has a guarantee of income, a permanent connection to the labor market or employer provided protections (Zwick, [2018](#)), ultimately resulting in precarity and exploitation.

As scholars have been quick to point out, gig and temporary labor are linked with growing inequality and insecurity for workers on the one hand and subsequently capital accumulation for firms on the other (Scholz, [2017](#); Standing 2011; Theodore, 2003; Zwick, [2018](#)). Temporary and gig laborers often go for long periods of time without health insurance, paid leave, and a stable income (Berg & Johnston, [2019](#); Purser, [2012](#)). Further parallels emerge between the temp and gig industries, as they both extract profit from workers, use mechanisms of surveillance and control and function as a job matching service (Gonos, [1997](#); Healy et al., [2017](#)). Meanwhile these flexible



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Conversely, recent rulings in Miami went in favor of the gig-industry, as a worker was denied unemployment benefits after he was shut out of a ride-sharing app, essentially firing him from his job (Hanks, [2017](#)). These examples highlight the role of cities in mediating or mitigating the impacts of the gig economy.

Beyond the regulatory connections to cities, these flexible forms of labor rely on a concentration of workers and customers; factors typical of urban areas. Reflected in the geography of low-wage temp agencies, areas that lack job opportunities and hold high unemployment rates are prime locations for 'hiring halls'. Temp agencies have a vested interest in being located closest to their product; unemployed workers. Locating near swathes of folks with a lack of employment options allows for temp agencies to provide on-demand workers for their clients with ease (Peck & Theodore, [2001](#); Purser, [2012](#)). Similarly, with the increase in app-based on-demand service platforms, concentrations of clients and available workers become crucial for successful operation for companies such as Uber, Wag, Task Rabbit or Insta-cart. For example, Uber, a company that boasts personal on-demand drivers in just a few minutes, would have a difficult time operating efficiently and as advertised in more rural or suburban areas with considerable sprawl. Large geographic gaps between customers and workers make this business model less viable, particularly when considering a company such as Uber or Lyft who provide services at a fraction of the cost of their Taxi Cab counterparts.

In addition, the rise in gig economy work has revealed a primary barrier to workers: the lack of paid job posting opportunities. The after-effects of this as an impact on the labor market are important to consider. The rise in gig economy work has revealed a primary barrier to workers: the lack of paid job posting opportunities. The after-effects of this as an impact on the labor market are important to consider. The rise in gig economy work has revealed a primary barrier to workers: the lack of paid job posting opportunities. The after-effects of this as an impact on the labor market are important to consider.




process transpires in decidedly uneven ways. Integral to uneven development are the state institutions intervening to provide a favorable regulatory landscape for capital accumulation (Brenner & Theodore, [2002](#)). Labor markets at the city level are produced by patterns of uneven development which result from neoliberal governance and ultimately, develop unevenly as well (Peck & Theodore, [2001](#)).

While this interaction can be taken as an unintended consequence, there are additional intentional manipulations of the labor market working to drive down unionized and stable employment while valorizing flexible labor markets. The recent battle between Uber and the city of Austin can be seen as evidence of this interplay. In 2016, Uber and Lyft left Austin after legislation was passed requiring regulations of transport companies, including stricter background checks and security measures. Prior to the passage of legislation, Uber invested over \$8m in advertising and campaigning against the proposed measures. Once the legislation passed, Uber and Lyft abruptly stopped service, which also meant they abruptly eliminated jobs (Sisson, [2016](#)). Recently, with the passage of state-wide legislation, Uber and Lyft have returned to Austin sans stricter background checks and increased security measures (Sisson, [2017](#)). This example reveals a complex relationship between regulatory bodies, cities and flexible labor markets, all of which are concealed by terming this the 'sharing economy.'

Across cities, unions are under attack, full-time, stable and well-paid employment opportunities are being replaced by part-time and social welfare jobs, and the labor market is being restructured under which flexible labor markets are being valorized. This is a complex and dynamic and complex relationship between regulatory bodies, cities and flexible labor markets, all of which are concealed by terming this the 'sharing economy.'

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Where Is Economic Development in the Platform City?

Jamaal W. Green

Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA

In the online sci-tech magazine OneZero, Susie Cagle, a journalist and commentator on Silicon Valley politics and labor practices, offers a retrospective analysis provocatively titled 'The Sharing Economy Was Always A Scam' (Cagle [2019](#)). She describes how early ventures, like the first iteration of Zipcar or CouchSurfing, were more idiosyncratic or collective in nature and that these contemporary businesses, transformed by the demands of venture capital, have morphed into naked rent seekers. An always vague concept, the 'sharing economy' - to paraphrase Cagle - did not tame the excesses of capitalism and consumerism, but stoked them.

The ultimate result of this shift, Cagle emphasizes, is that 'sharing economy' companies

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While there is a growing realization of the challenges platform companies pose to cities in terms of traditional planning priorities, such as residential land-use conflicts and traffic impacts, the threat these companies pose in terms of local labor markets and their conception of economic development is just as, if not more, harmful than some of these more conspicuous issues. As 'platform' companies continue to try to dominate municipal and state policies while promising efficiency and prosperity, it is incumbent upon us to critically appraise what kind of prosperity these companies promise.


Misclassification and Wage Theft

Platform companies are adept at constantly changing their public facing missions while pursuing the same profit-driven ends. The branding shift from 'sharing' to 'platform' by companies like Lyft is emblematic of this shift. While this rebranding can be read as another example of casual corporate cynicism, the adoption of 'platform' as a label serves a specific goal. That goal is the systemic misclassification of many of these companies' largest class of workers in order to maximize profit while minimizing any hint of liability.

Worker misclassification is the labelling of workers as independent contractors, as oppose to actual employees of the firm. The benefits to the firm are obvious. Firms have no greater responsibility to independent contractors, such as providing health

benefits. One could argue that this is a common practice in the gig economy, but it is actually a form of wage theft. Companies, such as Lyft, misclassify their workers as independent contractors as an excuse to avoid providing health

benefits. Employment practices in the food service industry, such as restaurants, and retail at the bottom end of the wealth spectrum are often recognized as a problem of the industry. Worker misclassification is a form of wage theft.



hours and the manner in which certain tasks are completed (Weil [2017](#)). When a company can dictate to you how long you have to work and the way that you perform the work then it is clear you are not independent but actually an employee. For Uber/Lyft, classifying their hundreds of thousands of drivers as independent contractors saves them hundreds of millions of dollars a year in obligations, two of the most important being paying a minimum wage and offering overtime. Of course, the basic proposition by these firms that drivers are contractors is hard to accept as they control basic aspects of the everyday operations of drivers, such as dictating the look of cars and policing driver behavior through soliciting feedback from customers to offer performance reviews to drivers. Additionally, Uber and Lyft offer supplemental services to their drivers that further place them under corporate control through vehicle financing schemes that charge exorbitant rates for drivers to either buy or lease a new car for the purpose of giving rides. The relationship of these companies to their employees can only be described as predatory.

Misclassification can be seen as one aspect of a larger epidemic of wage theft, a tremendous problem in the US that results in billions of dollars per annum in lost wages (Traub [2017](#)). Joining other low road employers many platform companies go beyond the bureaucratic strategy of misclassification and move to blatant theft as a matter of policy. Instacart and Doordash, popular food and grocery delivery companies, are

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Beyond the questionable labor practices of these firms, critics of the sharing/gig/platform economy like Cagle point towards the utterly cynical and dishonest rhetoric around what these companies actually are. Just as 'sharing' ultimately was little more than a branding instrument for many of these firms, the notion of the 'platform' is equally empty of any real meaning, and in the case of labor, a deliberate misrepresentation to free these firms of any responsibility they have to the bulk of their labor force.

What is a platform? If you take the word of the major players in this space, then a platform is simply any middleman service that connects buyers (or renters) to sellers. But even under casual scrutiny it is clear that 'platform' companies do not even meet their own shallow definition. These companies are not simply a featureless plane where market actors can meet (a real example of this would-be Craigslist), but fully fledged service providers that are intimately involved in every stage of the service process. Uber and Lyft do not merely provide an app, but dictate standards on driver behavior and car cleanliness. Airbnb is not merely Craigslist with pretty pictures, but nearly a fully-fledged property management company. Beyond allowing them to steal wages from their workers, these companies who label themselves 'platforms' are afforded the excuse to violate any other number of regulations. One of the more egregious examples of this is Airbnb's facile claim to being merely a platform even as it

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funded opposition. Additionally, cities were, and remain, way too credulous with respect to the claims of 'platform' companies especially on questions pertaining to economic development.

A necessary first step is for planners to view the economic development claims of these companies with a much more critical eye. What kind of growth do these companies promise? What are the actual corporate strategies the company takes with respect to labor or taxes? Is it friendly to employee bargaining? Are most of its employees direct employees or are their workers routed through a series of opaque staffing agencies?

Planners should also offer a clear vision of the kind of work that will allow their residents to lead fulfilled lives. Such a vision can include job upgrading through labor market policy such as determining a proper living wage and mandating sick leave. Beyond that, economic development planners should identify industries that offer good pay, benefits and advancement for all classes of workers, and seek to expand those. This can include encouraging, or protecting, certain industrial users at risk of being pushed out of industrial districts due to commercial and residential conversion, and working with anchor institutions to invest in local communities and worker cooperatives such as the Evergreen Cooperatives. These kinds of approaches offer a more coherent, inspiring, and equitable vision of labor markets than anything that Uber, Airbnb, or DoorDash can offer.

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Notes on contributor

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Shared Economy: WeWork or We Work Together

dominic t. moulden

Resource Organizer, ONE DC, Washington, USA

The Manhattan Laundry in the 1980s was an abandoned, Art Deco designed laundry in the heart of Shaw and a few blocks away from ‘Black Broadway’ – the historic U Street area in Northwest DC (Figure 1). Today if you browse the WeWork Manhattan Laundry website you will see a description for a “handsome building on Florida Ave” featuring coffee shops and a beer garden (<https://www.wework.com/buildings/manhattan-laundry-washington-DC>). The description continues with ‘the site attracts “creative firms”, tech startups and nonprofit organizations’. For people like me, who have walked and traveled to the building, the WeWork website provides a detailed reading of Richard Florida’s (2002) socioeconomic theory of the creative economy (Florida, 2002).

Figure 1.





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BWWC and is currently providing economic, legal, technical, and intern support to two Latinx worker-owned cooperatives in the development phase; - Co-Familia, a childcare coop and Dulce Hogar, a cleaning coop. On the wellness side of our organisation, the BWWC hosts community mediation and restorative justice training, returning citizens' skills job training, and job development programs with Friends and Families of Incarcerated People and the Re-entry Network.

The shared economy we are building is about authentic bonding and cooperative values based on democratic economics. Real sharing is designed, planned, and practiced as a social, political, and economic goal. The bottom line is a people and ecological-based ecosystem of humane, balance, and earth-friendly work, play, and living.

We work together as a collective process. We work together to create cooperative spaces for shared work and shared values. We work together not to maximize capital extraction. Maximizing profits is viewed as an unhealthy economic principle. A healthy economy is practiced when humans and nature are tied together in a daily work ecosystem, where the needs of everyone and everything are given consideration for fully living a happy and balanced life.

Together laborers and managers confront challenges of capitalism. Workers struggle daily in a precarious and extractive work place and faux spaces, such as WeWork.

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and gender equity. Their vision is an economy that works for all. The Green Worker Cooperatives range from artisanal art, birthing services, cleaning services, compost, food, manufacturing and design.

If and when we work together, we can create a non-extractive, humane and ecologically stable shared economy for all, and gradually challenge and replace the unstable, precarious, destructive, extractive capitalist class and exploitative individually centered economy. It is time to plan, design, and boldly create a shared economy.

The Working World (www.theworkingworld.org) identifies the root of the precarious shared economy with the historical crises of 'the extractive economy.' TWW states clearly on their website that "our system makes profit for a few by extracting from people and planet." Their goal is to transform this current crisis into a "democratic economy." Here's how they do it: they recreate finance that is non-extractive, provide pragmatic training through democratizing capital and democratizing knowledge, they put people in charge so communities control resources - and they plan to grow virally and transform the world. TWW invests in workers and community owned businesses, like those which the Green Worker Cooperatives create and develop.

Can this movement and new set of practices grow virally? There are a few of us cooperative organizers and practitioners who believe it is gradually making waves.

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economic practice in cooperatives. Learning this history has framed our development of Cooperation DC as part of a long trajectory of Black freedom movement work to not only provide economic security, but to also build community power. Cooperative movement organizing succeeds when people come together to study and learn about alternatives. Study groups and learning circles are a key part of building a collective and people-centered economy.

If and when WE WORK TOGETHER, we can create a non-extractive, humane, ecological, stable and shared economy for all. We can gradually challenge and replace the unstable, precarious, destructive, and extractive capitalist class and exploitative individually centered economy. It is time to bravely plan, design, and create a shared economy.

Notes on contributor

dominic t. moulden is a community organizer and resource organizer at ONE DC. Over the past 33 years he organized residents throughout DC on issues related to their right to land, housing, income, jobs, health and wellness. He is an adjunct faculty at the Maryland Institute College of Art, where he teaches critical race theory and community organizing. dmoulden@one-dc.org

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