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
# Together all the way? Abeyance and co-optation of Sunni networks in Lebanon

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opted movements may easily turn against the authorities once again. Moreover, local legacies of protests may be used as resources by new protest leaders.

KEYWORDS:

- Contentious politics
- abeyance processes
- high-risk contexts
- Islamism
- social networks
- Lebanon








Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In this article, I distinguish between formal social movement organizations (SMOs) and more informal protest networks. The latter are more common in the Middle East today. Another category is represented by networks of everyday interaction, based in local communities, which may become politicized and transformed into a social movement.
2. ‘Political’ refers to the strategic purpose of the interaction with authorities.
3. I adopt a critical perspective, viewing the relationship between the conflict and the protest as a process.
4. As a result, only those who are considered to have given up (Fillieule, 2010) are included in the study.
5. The Fatah movement was founded in the 1990s; after his death, the movement lost popularity.



6. It is more precise to limit the term 'co-optation' to the granting of some sort of official functions to former members of dissident movements (violent or non-violent), in exchange for their ending the protest campaign. A quite different case is the granting by the regimes in power of privileges to conservative Islamist movements which never engaged in dissidence.
7. Likewise, some protest networks may also have undefined relations to state power (Dobry, [2009](#), [1986](#), p. 11).
8. Interview, Erik Fosse, Oslo, March 2014.
9. Under the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the Lebanese Army did not have access to the Palestinian refugee camps.
10. Informal discussions, politicians and inhabitants in Tripoli, 2008–2016.
11. Interview, Fatima Akkawi, Tripoli, June 2012.
12. Interview, Nahla Chahal, Beirut, June 2012.
13. Discussions, residents in Bab al-Tebbaneh and Abi Samra, Tripoli, 2008–2016.
14. Interview, former member of Jund Allah in Bab al-Tebbaneh, Tripoli, August 2011.
15. Interview,  2009.
16. Interview, 
17. Interview, 
18. Email, 
19. Interview, 
20. The  dononym used by Roug
21. Shei
22. Interview
23. Interview,  anonymous former Tawhid member, August 2009.

24. Discussions with anonymous former Tawhid members, August 2009–August 2017.
25. Personal observations, Tripoli, 2008–2016.
26. As Minqara is a well-known figure, he is not anonymized here.
27. Interview, Hashim Minqara, Tripoli, April 2008.
28. As al-Hassan is a well-known figure, he is not anonymized here.
29. Salafis are distinguished by their common creed ('aqida), which centred on the strict adherence to the principle of Tawhid (the oneness of Allah) and their rejection of human reasoning and logics. Wiktorowicz, [2006](#), p. 60.
30. A total of around 200 Lebanese, including some Salafi sheikhs in north Lebanon, participated in the Afghan jihad. (al-Atrache, [2007](#)).
31. Interview, Salim Alloush, Tripoli, April 2008.
32. 'Hisham' is a pseudonym. Some personal details have been omitted for reasons of anonymity.
33. Interview, former Jund Allah member, Bab al-Tebbaneh, Tripoli, June 2009.
34. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, October 2016.
35. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
36. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
37. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
38. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
39. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
40. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
41. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
42. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, May 2010.
43. Interviews, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, October 2016.

44. Observation of the site al-Jond.com, Spring of 2012.

45. ‘Dialogue with a leader’ (in Arabic), interview aired on al-Fajr radio, September 2007, reposted on al-Jond.com (accessed February 2009).

46. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, October 2016.

47. Observations of political posters, Bab al-Tebbaneh and Abi Samra, May 2009, August 2009 and June 2010.

48. Interviews, Mustafa Alloush, Tripoli, 2010–2012.

49. Interview, Mustafa Alloush, Tripoli, June 2012.

50. Interview, anonymous Islamist figure in Tripoli, April 2016.

## Additional information

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### Notes on



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