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Investing in the Future: The One Child Policy and Reform

The One Child Policy (1979) has been controversial for its detrimental effects on women's health in China as well as on the status of women and human rights more generally. In the early stages of implementation, sex selective and coerced abortions, infanticide, and forced sterilization disproportionately affected women by making them responsible for bearing sons and for suffering the consequences when they failed to do so (Bauer et al. [1992](#); Croll [2000](#); Johnson [1996](#); Kristof and WuDunn [1994](#); Milwertz [1997](#); Summerfield [1994](#)). However, in recent years the policy has allowed greater flexibility, permitting additional children under special circumstances and using less direct violence to ensure compliance.

With less draconian enforcement, there are some unexpected economic gains related to the One Child Policy experienced by young women, most notably in the urban setting. Some of these changes include increases in educational opportunities for women and greater or more equal value assigned to women as workers, both of which

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policies were adopted by the state in the early 1950s, the population pressures began building rapidly and the emphasis switched from promoting to limiting population growth.¹ High fertility rates and a large population were hindering development in China, and the state was concerned about its ability to feed the population. Thus in the mid 1950s, several efforts were made to curb rapid population growth, with “family planning” campaigns being promoted throughout China, encouraging women to limit family size.² These policies were in contrast to those implemented in the early 1950s, when the state had adopted a pronatalist stance and birth control was restricted from women. From 1957 to 1973, fertility declined from 6.21 to 4.51 children per woman in China and in more developed urban areas like Beijing the decline was even more pronounced from 6.07 to 2.55 children per woman (Scharping [2003](#), 267).³

By the 1970s there was also pressure on the state to examine the environmental consequences of development, with international scrutiny placed on developing states with large populations. Although a natural progression through the demographic transition is expected as states experience economic prosperity, pressure has been disproportionately placed on developing states to limit population growth. The One Child Policy emerged in the context of both these international and domestic trends, where social concerns were placed secondary to the state's economic growth.

Hershatter ([2007](#)) notes that “The government argued that if drastic steps were not taken to develop, national result (Potter [1990](#);

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punishments to enforce the policy. Although many of these population targets and means of enforcement started in the 1970s, their effects did not become readily apparent or documented until the 1980s.

As population growth began to stray further from the targets in the 1980s, authorities moved away from incentives to more Draconian measures to ensure compliance. Severe fines, ration restrictions, and the denial of registration for higher order births (with implications for health, education, housing) were all used to persuade families to have just one child. Moreover, births were to be planned with the permission of one's work unit, which had the authority to give out birth permits dictating who was eligible to give birth in a given year. Births outside of the plan were not allowed, and strict measures were taken to avoid any embarrassments to one's work unit, village, or local family planning authorities. Although the disincentives were designed to discourage couples from violating the one child limit, Shen argues that the state "took for granted that women were solely responsible for reproduction and targeted women's fertility as if that was the problem" (Shen [2003](#), 81). Some of the measures taken by local authorities or work units to keep tabs on birth planning included mandatory IUD insertions, regular birth control and menstrual checks, forced abortions, and, in the case of repetitive violations, forced sterilization. In each instance it is clear that women were disproportionately targeted for punishment, and "of the four-fifths of a billion

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child allocation with a daughter. Thus to help counter some of these beliefs, special attention has been given to encourage families to value girls as much as boys with laws designed to treat women more equally in terms of marriage and property laws. Moreover, the use of ultrasound B machines, “originally intended for monitoring pregnancies and checking IUD insertions,” have been banned for their use in prenatal sex identification (Scharping [2003](#), 226). Despite these efforts, sex disparities have been prevalent and estimates claim as many as 30 million girls are “missing” today in China as a result of strict enforcement of the One Child Policy (Seager [2003](#), 40).⁵

By 1984, many problems surfaced and couples were not convinced that the costs outweighed the benefits of violating the policy. To address some of these concerns, the state introduced a series of exceptions that could allow couples to have more than one child. Scholars note that some of the exceptions include: parents who have a disabled child, families with only sons for generations, couples whose first child is a girl, couples where both partners are only children, ethnic minorities,⁶ permission for a second child if sufficient time has passed between births, and if the parents claim to experience “significant hardship” by having only one child (Attane [2001](#); Attane [2002](#); Hesketh, Li, and Zhu [2005](#); Liang and Li [2006](#); Shen [2003](#); Short and Zhai [1998](#)). These special exemptions did not mean enforcement of the policy was any less draconian, with late term abortions and forced sterilization continuing as methods of “birth control.” Even

with the percent reduction (16). Consequently, from 1979 to 1999, the number of children per woman decreased from 1.78 children per woman to 1.18 children per woman. This was a motivational factor for greater development of the policy raises



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rather than letting the families and husbands," make decisions about reproduction (Greenhalgh [2001](#), 869). Arguably, this is not a true liberation, where women are in control of their own bodies and reproductive health, but it has reduced the burden of endless childbearing on women. With birth limitations, women are not allowed to continue having children until they produce a son, which has helped reduce sex preference for some couples, most notably in urban areas. The fact that 30 million girls remain "missing" in China is still problematic, the result of many years of strict policy enforcement. However, distinctions must be made between the harsh periods of enforcement in the 1980s, which have contributed to the large number of daughters missing today, and the last few years when enforcement has been less stringent. Furthermore, indifference with regard to the sex of a child does not necessarily hold true for rural areas where traditions have continued to place emphasis on bearing sons.⁸ It is primarily in the more developed urban areas that we see the quest for a son is becoming less prominent. Since the majority of China's population is rural as opposed to urban, the number of missing daughters is higher when numbers are aggregated for China as a whole, and even within particular provinces with large rural populations. Thus Greenhalgh's arguments on reproductive liberation must be understood within this context. These findings still do not negate the fact that individual choice has been co-opted by the state and that personal desires to have more children exist in both urban and rural China. I would argue the real question is to what extent son preference still exists w

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occurred increasingly provide job opportunities that target young women. Although some of these occupations focus more on appearance rather than skills, it is producing a generation of more confident young women who are socially mobile (Greenhalgh and Winckler [2005](#); Zhang Zhen [2001](#)). Thus in terms of labor, limiting couples to one child has given many young women more prospects for greater human capital investment and jobs, thereby producing higher expectations and motivation with regard to their position in society.

Son preference in urban China does appear to be changing, and researchers have found in larger cities like Beijing and Shanghai satisfaction levels with regard to daughters are just as high as they would be for sons (Scharping [2003](#); Shanor and Shanor [1995](#)). My own survey work with Beijing women in 2001–2002 further develops this point, where women indicated that a child's sex was less important and daughters were equally desired by couples. One Beijing woman explained, “When children grow up they are expected to take care of the parents. One child means one opportunity” (Personal Interview, 22 June 2002). The assumption is that if you only get one child, a boy or girl will be beneficial as long as you make the proper investment in his/her education and life chances. Although sons have traditionally been responsible for caring for their parents in their old age, the one child policy has forced parents to see their daughters as part of their aging safety net. Thus a couple's investment in their child is for the

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fewer domestic demands arguably change how women allocate their time. With a lighter household burden, women may have more time to devote to the development of a career (Perry [1998](#), 280). Moreover, the one child policy has helped transfer childcare duties to grandparents, making it “easier for young mothers to remain in the workforce” (Parish and Busse [2000](#), 214). Grandparents become relevant because they have adjusted their lifestyles and residence to respond to their family's needs, reflecting a social exchange across different generations (Chen [2005](#), 143). Young working women do not have to immediately rush home to care for children when grandparents are contributing to childcare, giving women more hours to devote to their public sphere work. My own survey data supports these claims and are discussed in the next section, where the childcare duties of older women that reflect care for their grandchildren is discussed. Therefore, the policy has given some women more choices and control in how they can invest in public sphere employment as well as leisure time.

The unexpected social and economic outcomes of the policy that have been discussed here, should only be examined as part of a system currently in place and should not be mistaken as a call to strengthen or advocate the policy's adoption elsewhere. Moreover, any “benefits” to the policy are best understood as unintended side effects rather than intentional efforts to assist the status of women. It is also important to note that the economic gains discussed here refer primarily to young urban women, and must be

examined in the context of the broader social and economic environment. The positive effects on women's status and economic participation are still quite nuanced, and the policy is still in the process of being evaluated. Making the one child policy a resource for women's empowerment is further in need of research. The experience of women's status, economic participation, and the one child policy. Moreover, the family structure and attitudes



To get a better sense of the effects of the policy and the trends that are starting to emerge at the micro-level, I draw on survey data I collected from 292 Beijing women in 2001–2002. The women were all selected on the basis of their age (20 to 60 years old) and urban residency according to their official household registration in Beijing. They were asked a series of questions on public and private sphere life, family dynamics, and their impressions of local and national reform.¹² The effects of the One Child Policy can be seen in the different family patterns across the three cohorts of women. Women in the oldest category (ages 46 to 60) were the most likely to have multiple children, women in the middle category (ages 33 to 45) frequently had only one child, and the youngest group (ages 20 to 32) had only one child, if any at all. The survey data are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy in Beijing and whether urban women have changed their attitudes on family size and the desired sex of a child. Their assessments of the policy also provide insight into whether it is still deemed necessary for Chinese economic development and what purpose or role the policy serves in future reform.

One indicator of son preference would be to examine the male to female sex ratios of children. The state's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported Beijing's sex ratio in 2001 as 108 boys to 100 girls, but has indicated a steady decline since that time to approximately 103 boys to 100 girls in 2005 as reported by the All China Women's

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


of boys. If a couple makes an appeal for a second child exemption or chooses to give birth to another child without permission, the assumption is that the intent is to have a son rather than a daughter. However, again in the sample we see that a larger percentage of girls rather than boys were born. These ratios held true for women who gave birth to additional children both before and after the policy was implemented. Among those who reported having additional children in violation of the one child policy, generalizations on higher order births are difficult to make given the small size of the sample.¹⁴ However, the rationale for their decision to have additional children in spite of the policy provides insight into their attitudes on sex preferences.

Sex ratios alone at the national or local level are inadequate because they only tell us about births and do not tell us about the other factors that may influence a woman's decisions about childbirth.¹⁵ To better understand the policy's effects on women requires a more in-depth examination of women's attitudes. Specifically, did women have a son preference motivating their childbirth decisions and did economic factors affect their choices?

When asked about sex preferences the women did not place significant personal emphasis on the sex of the child. For the oldest cohort, they were not strictly bound by the same birth restrictions as the younger groups and although some indicated feeling pressure at the time to have a son, there was still the ability to try again. Several of these women had already had a son when they had their first child. Economic security came with the first child and the pressure to have more children was reduced. They may continue to have children until the birth of a son. The sex of the child is not the primary concern. The children are more important than the sex of the child.

One key factor in their decision to have a second child was their economic situation. In a strict state with no exemptions, combined with the one-child policy, women felt greater pressure to have a son.



their families had not really pressured them. Some women in this cohort did violate the policy and have more than one child, but the driving force was not linked to sex preference. One woman revealed that she simply wanted to have more children and did not care about the sex of the child (Personal Interview, June 28 2002), whereas another woman indicated she decided to try for a third child because she knew she could afford to have one (Personal Interview, June 3 2002). Although not all of the women with additional children indicated it was a planned decision, the penalties inflicted by the state also did not explicitly deter them from violating the policy. The few women who had multiple children had varying economic backgrounds, so for both the wealthy and less affluent the penalties were negligible compared to the personal benefits they would receive from larger families.

For the women with only one child in both the middle and youngest cohorts, again most indicated they were not concerned about the sex of their child. While some women acknowledged a desire for a boy originally, they claimed it was less of a reflection on their personal choice and associated it with the perceived expectations of their husbands, parents, or other family members. Still they claimed this was not pressure as much as it was about conveying well wishes for a son. Women without children also did not specify a sex preference with regard to their plans for children in the future, and saw no real advantage to one sex over the other. However many of the women without

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implemented. In terms of the survey reported choices. With the more focused When discussing which school their child ol versus another ted



of schooling for boys and girls alike. In Beijing, where average annual income was approximately 20,000 Yuan, one woman reported paying 10,000 Yuan per exam point that same year for her child to get into a good junior high school (Personal Interview, December 26 2001), not including the high tuition fees. The high costs of raising a child under these conditions have led women to dismiss the idea of additional children as financially unfeasible. In addition there seemed to be a competitive spirit among the women when they discussed how many extracurricular activities (sports, music, computer/language instruction, etc.) their children were involved in to round out their “academic experience.” Even women without children expressed the desire that someday their children would have a childhood either equal to or better than their own in terms of quality of life factors. Their own financial situation and their awareness of the increasing competition in both education and employment have changed how women see their children and the opportunities they can provide for them.

On the basis of family pressure, personal desires, and economic factors, women in the Beijing sample did not report a strong sex preference when it came to the sex of their child. As one women with a daughter said, “After the birth of my child, the (child's) sex is not important. All I can think about is how to be a good mother” (Personal Interview, May 25 2002). Even when asked if they would like to have more children without the restrictions in place, the women in the sample did not express desires to have larger families

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problems despite expressing concern about the slow pace of reform and instead encouraging residents that the trickle down benefits will eventually reach them. While the survey data demonstrate urban attitudes on family size and sex ratios are in sync with the policy's efforts to both reduce family size and increase the value of girls, the real impact on attitudes appears to be related to economic reform and the high cost of raising children. Therefore, the question is whether a restrictive birth planning program is still needed or if the economic changes we see in urban China can successfully encourage lower birth rates, revalue girls, and satisfy the state's economic goals.

THE NEXT STAGE OF REFORM

Analyzing the different reforms that have taken place over the last 28 years, the contemporary challenges facing China cannot be identified as simply a population problem, because they are increasingly a distribution problem. One of the biggest challenges for the state has been providing for the growing needs of the population, which have intensified with economic reform. Promises of trickle down benefits are not enough to appease the new generation of Chinese who have embraced Deng Xiaoping's reform era slogan "to get rich is glorious" and are seeking faster and better results. The One Child Policy is simply one part of China's grand strategy for economic development. Infrastructure, education, and health care are all areas where the state has invested heavily. The One Child Policy has been a key part of that strategy, but it is clear that the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens. The state has a chance to provide a better life for its citizens by focusing on smaller families, but it will need to invest heavily in education and health care. The long argument has been that the state should focus on smaller families, but it will need to invest heavily in education and health care. The implications of the One Child Policy are still being debated, but it is clear that the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens. The effect of the One Child Policy on the population has been significant, but it is still unclear whether the state's policy has been successful in achieving its goals. However, the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens. The right for the state to control the population is a complex issue, and it is clear that the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens. Inequality is a major problem in China, and the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens. The state's ability to control the population is a complex issue, and it is clear that the state has a long way to go to provide the basic needs of its citizens.



of resource distribution problems facing the state (Currier [2005](#); Howell [2000](#); Hurst and O'Brien 2001; Perry [1995](#); Tang and Parish [2000](#)). Although this unrest is seen primarily as an economic challenge, the aforementioned problems have both economic and social implications. While the state has tried to downplay the importance or significance of this growing unrest, the resource and labor problems are placing increasing pressures on the state to adjust the path and pace of reform. The One Child Policy is relevant to these issues in the sense that some of the inequalities and pension problems are actually made worse by the policy's continued implementation. Worker to retiree ratios are increasing financial burdens on younger and older generations of workers, couples of all ages are struggling with the 4-2-1 problem, and the varied implementation of the policy according to wealth draws attention to growing inequalities and the privileges awarded to the upper classes of urbanites. Each of these problems places pressure on the state to alleviate economic inequalities while maintaining the economic targets promised under reform. However, to understand how change can occur, it is necessary to examine how the Chinese have generally approached the question of reform and how the state sees its role in the process.

One of the strengths of the Chinese system has been the controlled nature of reform and the gradualist policies adopted by the state. Rapid and potentially destabilizing change has been avoided with the state managing the reform process, although it no

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the people's basic economic needs in the public sphere, which is becoming difficult as privatization exacerbates inequalities.

Marketization has already changed economic and social life, creating a more competitive labor force, housing market, and education system, each offering economic motivation for limiting family size. The loss of the iron rice bowl, the uncertainty and insecurity in employment, the struggle to find affordable and ample housing, and the growth of competition in education and the labor force are giving families a sense of future financial insecurity. A couple's children are an investment in their own economic well-being, as the social safety net continues to erode under reform. Thus families are investing more of their time and money into cultivating the perfect only child and having more than one child would be a financial challenge for most (Attane [2001](#); Hesketh, Li, and Zhu [2005](#); Mcloughlin [2005](#); Tsui and Rich [2002](#)). Sport lessons, music lessons, after school tutoring, or FasTrackKids programs have become a growing part of everyday life for urban Chinese children and families are quickly realizing they do not have the disposable resources to afford additional children.¹⁶ The Beijing women interviewed reported they were content with having one child, even without the policy in place, and similar surveys have found that urban women generally want fewer children (Hesketh, Li, and Zhu [2005](#)). In the case of the Beijing sample, the women were influenced by both time and money. Others have argued the dilemmas of space

are also compelling, inadequate housing, and cramped, and for large families. their current e

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become “reemployed” as caregivers for grandchildren. For example, one Beijing woman remarked, “My mother is at home taking care of my daughter. I know someone is looking after her while we work so I don't worry about staying at work late” (Personal Interview, 1 July 2002). Meanwhile the state is not being forced to provide more childcare facilities, and older cohorts who may have been pushed into early retirement are occupied with family responsibilities, while younger generations remain active in the labor force to support the pension system.¹⁷ Thus, the state has been able to utilize the policy to serve a larger economic and social purpose, altering household structures and labor market dynamics while diverting attention from its economic inadequacies. Rather than providing more jobs, more childcare, or a more sustainable pension scheme, the state is using the One Child Policy as a temporary fix and to postpone these developments.

For the few that can choose to have more than one child, the economic punishments used in the past such as withholding subsidies or access to public services, are no longer compelling with the decline of the state sector, and a return to physical coercion would not be tolerated at the local level or within the international community. The economic inequalities that exist within the urban setting as well as between urban and rural areas have become more pronounced with marketization (Khan et al. [1993](#); Knight and Song [1999](#); Lu and Sit [2001](#); Meng [2000](#); Riskin, Zhao, and Li [2001](#); Y. Wang [1995](#);

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operate with greater freedom, given the state's inability to regulate their increasingly privatized economic lives.

As more children become “little emperors and empresses,” another major concern is how the state will be able to meet the expectations and high standards of a more demanding generation of only children who are being transformed by a new materialist and consumer-driven society.¹⁸ These expectations of the younger generation include the ability to find adequate employment opportunities that they can use to support both themselves and their parents in their old age. The state has argued that the One Child Policy is necessary to reduce the pressures on an already oversaturated job market and to better allocate its limited resources. However, the state's modernization goals are becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill since the One Child Policy is also reducing the worker to retiree ratio and is placing greater pressure on the state to provide a new social safety net as the population begins to age. With children traditionally serving as a form of social security, and economic liberalization and privatization eroding the security formerly provided by the state, the challenge to the state is how to satisfy the economic needs of society without adopting more repressive policies.

If one of the underlying problems facing the state is resource distribution, reforming the One Child Policy would be a step in the right direction towards the state's long term economic development (e.g., infrastructure, health care, education, etc), as well as to deviate some of the pressure on children who are expected to support their parents. The state has been working to offset the effects of the policy by promoting the development of urban areas and encouraging childbearing. The beginning of the One Child Policy's impact on the family structure is that the average family size will not come



In many urban areas, fertility is already at below replacement levels and an aging population means that a “reduction in the number of children and youth cannot make up for the additional number of people in old age who will have to be supported by the active population” (Scharping [2003](#), 328). Lutz, Scherbov, and Sanderson argue that Asian states can expect their elderly proportion of their population to probably quadruple, with China's projected to reach nearly 40 percent by 2100 at the current rate (2003, 125, 133). In Beijing, recent estimates (2005) place the elderly population at 13.1 percent and growing by 4 percent each year (People's Daily Online). Mcloughlin notes that these trends are “especially grave since fewer than 40 percent of urban retirees have any pension; in rural settings, the proportion is so low as to be negligible” (Mcloughlin [2005](#), 308). The downsizing of State Owned Enterprises under reform has pushed many older workers into early retirement and is restructuring labor opportunities in favor of younger workers. But this labor shifting was arguably done too quickly, and it has created large burdens on younger workers. The number of retirees in urban China are increasing “from 10 percent of the urban total in 2000 to 13 percent in 2010,” and “the ratio of employees to retirees in SOEs has already fallen to about 2:1” in major cities (Hurst and O'Brien [2002](#), 353). In addition, Hurst and O'Brien point out that labor restructuring for older generations of workers has been exceptionally hard given their limited resources and little chance of being reabsorbed into the new market economy. Members of this cohort are also more likely to engage in protests and demonstrations.

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offsets the declining role of the state in job placement and social security, the artificial restrictions threaten the sustainability of the current path of reform. Presently, quality of life differences have become more pronounced in urban and rural areas and the social safety net has eroded but has not been replaced with an alternative that meets the needs of the less affluent portion of the population. Both of these issues fuel the dissatisfaction over inequality in Chinese society and place the state's development goals and stability in jeopardy. Although physical coercion is no longer a useful means to ensure compliance with the policy, socioeconomic factors are serving as an effective deterrent to large families. With only one child, both parents increasingly focus their attention and limited resources on their child's development as a top priority, regardless of sex, and strive to cultivate the child's talents to the best of their ability. One child is a necessity to provide for one's old age, but two is economically difficult. Nevertheless, the One Child Policy cannot fix the emerging economic and social problems that are facing the state, and the state cannot continue to enforce it in lieu of more advanced social and economic reforms if it wants to maintain its development course.

With numerous exceptions allowed for additional children, "the reality is that there is no national practice of a single-child policy, rather one child per family is a goal to which the nation aspires" (Mcloughlin [2005](#), 308). Currently 19 provinces, accounting for 52 percent (All China growth rate estimate percentage and the contribu declining grad widespre



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
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
population growth to allow China a chance to pursue meaningful economic reform and reach a higher level of economic development. Moreover, several unintended effects have emerged over time to increase the human capital investment placed in women and bring higher value to the birth of daughters. However these changes have not occurred on their own, and over the past 28 years the state has periodically revised the policy to reflect the needs of society. Examining the changes that have already occurred in terms of attitudes towards sex preference and family size there is reason to believe that in several areas a lasting social reform is emerging. A cohort analysis of women in Beijing has shown how economic conditions have changed couples' attitudes on large families and they have accepted these constraints by limiting themselves to one child. The current state of the economy has given urban couples incentives to follow the policy, but has also allowed them to draw on their expanding financial resources to circumvent the policy, thereby muting its effectiveness. The numerous loopholes and the regional variation in implementation have thereby made having one child more of a suggestion rather than an imperative. Thus the One Child Policy demands another round of revision. At present, the policy is simply buying the state time to develop a social security system, a task it knew would need to be addressed, but that it has not made significant steps to enact. I argue the state cannot continue to manipulate the private lives of its citizens and rely on the household to absorb the social and economic costs of reform. With most parents relying on their children for old-age security, the state must invest in social security programs and infrastructure to support the aging population. The state can use its resources to support infrastructure and social security programs and infrastructure to support the aging population.

Notes

1. In...
2. Family...



3. Population decline was the result of family planning and the Great Leap Forward, which took a toll on fertility. In addition, campaigns like the Cultural Revolution disrupted China socially and economically, and the separation of spouses during this period (1966–1976) also may have contributed to declined fertility.
4. Scharping reports that the incentives were modified in 1991 to add paid nursing leave and remove job recruitment preferences (see Scharping [2003](#), 130). The job preference changes likely stem from the labor reforms that implemented contract labor and removed lifetime employment guarantees.
5. Others have argued that the unnatural sex ratios have led to contemporary problems with trafficking, kidnapping, and prostitution as young men are unable to find mates. See Attane [2002](#), Hesketh, Li, and Zhu [2005](#), and Shanor and Shanor [1995](#)).
6. Minorities were not affected similarly by the policy to begin with.
7. National family planning health surveys have also claimed fertility was as low as 2.8 children per woman in 1979 and dropped to 1.7 children per woman in 2004 (see Hesketh, Li, and Zhu [2005](#) 1,172).
8. Reasons for the higher son preference include: carrying on the family name, social/cultural expectations with regard to sons and care for elderly parents, marriage practices, and the desire for a male heir. For many women, the preference for a son is a part of their husband's family and they are expected to work on it. This is a common part of the family's tradition and is often seen as a duty. The preference for a son is often linked to the family's honor and status. In many cultures, a son is seen as a provider and a protector, while a daughter is seen as a burden. This is often the result of traditional gender roles and expectations. The preference for a son is often linked to the family's honor and status. In many cultures, a son is seen as a provider and a protector, while a daughter is seen as a burden. This is often the result of traditional gender roles and expectations. The preference for a son is often linked to the family's honor and status. In many cultures, a son is seen as a provider and a protector, while a daughter is seen as a burden. This is often the result of traditional gender roles and expectations.
9. Additionally, the preference for a son is often linked to the family's honor and status. In many cultures, a son is seen as a provider and a protector, while a daughter is seen as a burden. This is often the result of traditional gender roles and expectations. The preference for a son is often linked to the family's honor and status. In many cultures, a son is seen as a provider and a protector, while a daughter is seen as a burden. This is often the result of traditional gender roles and expectations.
10. I also... policy, a... having a... discussi... privately



11. The policy has been criticized and met with resistance by Chinese feminists, but the state's control over organization and its ability to suppress public critique have kept those perspectives marginalized.

12. The sample was obtained by a combination of snowball and quota sampling. Furthermore, marital status, children, and age factors were comparable to statistics on Beijing as a whole when measured against the Beijing Statistical Yearbook and for the National Bureau of Statistics Yearbook for China.

13. One factor to consider with the higher sex ratios reported for all of Beijing, compared to the sample, is that Beijing as an administrative unit includes a variety of suburbs and surrounding areas, which also contain rural residents and not just urban residents.

14. Only six women, all in the middle cohort, reported violating the one child policy and gave birth to additional children without permission.

15. Reports on pregnancies would give a better indication of the use of abortion and possible use of sex selection techniques, but were not acceptable for inclusion on the survey. However, in interviews this information was obtained from some of the respondents.

16. FastTrack
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
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18. The
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19. China
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